defining the constitutionally required level of performance as "the exercise of the customary skill and knowledge which normally prevails at the time and place"
How later courts described this case
- defining the constitutionally required level of performance as "the exercise of the customary skill and knowledge which normally prevails at the time and place"
- “This standard [of normal competency] also makes it clear that the ultimate issue is not whether a defendant was prejudiced by his counsel’s acts or omission, but whether counsel’s performance was at the level of normal competency.”
- “A belated appointment of counsel [is] strong evidence in a defendant’s behalf.”
- "Adequate preparation for trial often may be a more important element in the effective assistance of counsel to which a defendant is entitled than the forensic skill exhibited in the courtroom. The careful investigation of a case and the thoughtful analysis of the information it yields may disclose evidence of which even the defendant is unaware and may suggest issues and tactics at trial which would otherwise not emerge."
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
VAN DUSEN, Circuit Judge
(concurring) :
I concur in the court’s opinion except to the extent that the language used on page 15 purports to hold, by way of obiter dictum, that the standard required of the states by the Fourteenth Amendment *741 in furnishing counsel to indigent defendants in criminal cases is contained in the authorities cited in footnote 27, as opposed to that stated in all the federal cases dealing with this question such as McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770-772 , 90 S.Ct. 1441 , 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 53-54 , 90 S.Ct. 1975 , 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970), the cases cited in ABA Standards Relating to Providing Defense Services, page 2, and our own decision in United States ex rel. Darcy v. Handy, 203 F.2d 407, 427 (3rd Cir. 1953), where this court emphasized the affirmative requirements of “complete loyalty” and efforts “in good faith to the best of [counsel’s] ability.” See, also, ABA Standards Relating to Providing Defense Services, Principles 1.1, 1.4, 2.2, 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, App. B, p. 68 (“counsel whose experience is commensurate with the seriousness of the charge”), p. 69 (par. 4, including “experienced, competent and zealous counsel”), App. C, pars. 1 and 7 (1967). See, also, ABA Standards Relating to the Prosecution Function and the Defense Function: The Defense Function, Principles 1.1, 1.2, 1.6, 3.1, 3.2, 3.5, 3.6, 3.7, 3.8, 3.9, 4.1, 4.4, 5.1, 5.2, and Parts VI, VII, and VIII (1970); ABA Standards Relating to Criminal Appeals, Principles 2.2, 3.2 (1969). Since the distinguished draftsmen of the ABA Standards Relating to Providing Defense Services concluded that (page 1):
“No controlling authority, either statute or decision, yet directly requires that the advocates must possess any particular standard of skill, but it is implicit that representation should be adequate to the need. No one can guarantee that the particular lawyer representing one side will be professionally the equal of the other; what is important is that the system for providing counsel and facilities for the defense be as good as the system which society provides for the prosecution.”
judicial restraint indicates that we should not articulate a standard in this area of the Fourteenth Amendment inasmuch as it is not involved in this federal criminal appeal and the Bar is taking vigorous steps to comply with the Fourteenth Amendment’s commands in this area. In carrying out the principles of the ABA Standards Relating to Defense Services, developments may occur which will enable a more effective standard to be formulated than that provided by the state decisions relied on in footnote 27.
MARIS, Circuit Judge, joins in this opinion.