stating that “the crucial element of a charge of discrimination is the factual statement contained therein” and that a charging party’s rights should not be cut off “merely because he fails to articulate correctly the legal conclusion emanating from his factual allegations”: by improperly labeling the type of discrimination to which he has been subjected
How later courts described this case
- stating that “the crucial element of a charge of discrimination is the factual statement contained therein” and that a charging party’s rights should not be cut off “merely because he fails to articulate correctly the legal conclusion emanating from his factual allegations”: by improperly labeling the type of discrimination to which he has been subjected
- explaining that the “selection of which box to check is ... nothing more than the attachment of a legal conclusion to the facts alleged” and that a party should not be “cut off merely because he fails to articulate correctly the legal conclusion emanating from his factual allegations”
- holding that "the allega- . tions in a judicial complaint ... ‘may encompass any kind of discrimination like or related to the allegations contained in the charge and growing out of such allegation during the pendency of the case before the Commission' "
- holding that “the allegations in a judicial complaint ... ‘may encompass any kind of discrimination like or related to the allegations contained in the charge and growing out of such allegation during the pen-dency of the ease before the Commission’ ”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by McWhorter v. Nucor Steel Birmingham Inc., 304 F. Supp. 3d 1185 (2018)
However, as explained in Davis v. Infinity Insurance Co. , Sanchez is distinguishable from cases, such as Plaintiff's, where a plaintiff was represented by counsel when filing his EEOC charge. 2017 WL 4224588 at *8.
Distinguished by EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. the BAILEY COMPANY, INC., Defendant-Appellee, 563 F.2d 439 (1977)
431 F.2d 455, is distinguishable on the facts from the present case.
Distinguished by H. Kessler & Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 53 F.R.D. 330 (1971)
Kessler argues that Sanchez is factually distinguishable from the instant case in that, inter alia, Sanchez involved a civil suit, whereas, this case involves the enforcement of a demand for evidence.
The opinion
GODBOLD, Circuit Judge:
I dissent from the denial of petition for rehearing.