shifting the burden of persuasion to defendant to prove an alibi is unconstitutional since the alibi is a direct denial of participation in the criminal act, not a justification for admitted conduct
How later courts described this case
- shifting the burden of persuasion to defendant to prove an alibi is unconstitutional since the alibi is a direct denial of participation in the criminal act, not a justification for admitted conduct
- instruction that shifts burden of proof on alibi not harmless even if "evidence conclusively demonstrates guilt"
- a flawed alibi instruction can undermine a jury's understanding of reasonable doubt
- burden of persuasion on government unaffected by assertion of alibi defense
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
MATTHES, Circuit Judge, with whom Chief Judge VAN OOSTERHOUT and Circuit Judge MEHAFFY
join, dissenting.
I concur in Chief Judge VAN OOST-ERHOUT’s dissent.
In examining the trial court’s comprehensive instructions, I find that the jury was informed on at least twelve different occasions that it was required to determine beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had committed the offense before it could find him guilty. In this posture, it is inconceivable to me that the defendant was deprived of the presumption of innocence by reason of the alibi instruction. I believe that the jury, presumptively composed of reasonably intelligent persons, understood that all essential elements of the offense had to be established beyond a reasonable doubt. For this reason I am unable to comprehend any rational basis upon which to interfere with the judgment of the state court in this post-conviction proceeding.