The opinion
PHILLIPS, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent.
My opinion is that there is no substantial evidence on the record considered as *4 a whole to support the Board’s decision that the employer interfered with, restrained and coerced its employees in the exercise of their organizational rights in violation of § 8(a) (1) of the Act. Universal Camera Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 340 U.S. 474 , 71 S.Ct. 456 , 95 L.Ed. 456 .
This case does not reflect the usual pattern of anti-union animus, accompanied by pressure and threats by management to influence the votes of employees. In Bourne v. N.L.R.B., 332 F.2d 47, 48 (2d Cir.), the following five standards are announced to determine whether interrogation, not itself threatening, is an unfair labor practice:
“(1) The background, i. e. is there a history of employer hostility and discrimination ?
“(2) The nature of the information sought, e. g. did the interrogator appear to be seeking information on which to base taking action against individual employees ?
“(3) The identity of the questioner, i. e. how high was he in the company hierarchy ?
“(4) Place and method of interrogation, e. g. was employee called from work to the boss’s office? Was there an atmosphere of ‘unnatural formality’?
“(5) Truthfulness of the reply.”
When these five standards are applied to the facts of the present case, in my view they do not support a finding that the interrogation was coercive.
The Board found six instances of more or less casual conversations. These are the types of interchange of views which normally would be expected to take place on the premises of a plant during a union organization campaign. Most of the discussions took place at the employees’ work station or around the plant yard. The conversations occurred between employees and low ranking supervising personnel, viz., the personnel manager, the plant security officer, an assembly foreman, a machine shop foreman and a foundry foreman. The atmosphere was casual and the discussions were brief. No c"°rcion, threats or intimidation were expressed. None of the employees answered in a way which would indicate that they felt coerced and intimidated. I do not believe any of these discussions, when considered in their context, are reasonably susceptible of an interpretation as implying threats, intimidation or coercion. In a small plant the exchange of ideas, comments and arguments between employees and supervisors is to be expected. I do not consider this type of grassroots discussion to be coercive in nature.
As said by this Court in N.L.R.B. v. Welsh Industries, Inc., 385 F.2d 538 , 540:
“To offend the Act, interrogation must rise to the level of coercion or restraint. Burke Golf Equipment Corp. v. NLRB, 284 F.2d 943, 944 (6th Cir. 1960); United Fireworks Mfg. Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 252 F.2d 428, 430 (6th Cir. 1958); NLRB v. Tennessee Coach Co., 191 F.2d 546, 555-556 (6th Cir. 1951). * * * The burden rests with the General Counsel to prove his charges; it is not required that the employer justify each innocuous inquiry about a union campaign. Lawson Milk Co. v. NLRB, 317 F.2d 756, 760 (6th Cir. 1963); NLRB v. Cleveland Trust Co., 214 F.2d 95, 99 (6th Cir. 1954).”
Applying the standard of review announced by this Court in N.L.R.B. v. Surprenant Mfg. Co., 341 F.2d 756 , I would hold that the inference drawn by the Board to the effect that the conversations constituted a threat or coercion is not reasonable or permissible under the record in this case. Viewing the entire record, the surrounding circumstances and the settings in which the conversations took place, it is my view that the comments of supervisory personnel were not such as to constitute unlawful coercion or restraint of employees in their rights under the Act. While recognizing that it is the province of the Board to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence, I view these six isolated conversations of no coercive consequence.
I would deny enforcement.