The opinion
SMITH, Judge
(dissenting).
While I agree with Judge Rich that this case should be reversed, I arrive at this conclusion for somewhat different reasons than are stated in his dissenting opinion. I agree with him that In re Dobeckmun Co., 286 F.2d 187 , 48 CCPA 810 (1960), is not properly applicable here, “when its facts are considered.” In Dobeckmun, this court pointed out that even a discriminating purchaser might well assume that the marks there in issue were trademarks on companion products of a single producer. Id. 286 F.2d at 188 , 48 CCPA at 813. On the facts before us here, I believe, as Judge Rich has indicated, that the “discriminating purchaser” argument has merit. I do not think, however, that the “rationale” of Dobeckmun, and the approach there taken in the analysis of trademark problems of the present type should be ignored even though other factors may well dictate the ultimate decision.
As a result of dissecting the competing marks to find their similarities and their differences, as I agree must be done, the only similarities of the marks reside in a common non-distinctive prefix. The prefix “BOR” or “BORE,” it seems to me, is somewhat descriptive of the respective apparatuses to which the marks are applied. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, these common portions of the marks under review must be considered to indicate the nature of the goods rather than the source of the goods. Section 2(d) of The Trademark Act of 1946 proscribes registration of a mark when, as applied to applicant’s goods, it is likely to cause confusion, mistake or to deceive. It is the likelihood of confusion, mistake or deception of purchasers as to the source of the goods on which applicant’s mark is used that forms the basis for the fundamental inquiry here.
The differences in the marks are found primarily in the respective suffixes, “MASTER” as used by the applicant and “-MATIC” as used by the opposer.
*461 As I compare the entire marks here in issue, keeping in mind the similarities and differences noted by dissection of the marks, it is my opinion that they differ so in sound, meaning and appearance that I believe there would be no likelihood of confusion, mistake or deception of discriminating purchasers as to the source of the goods arising by reason of the concurrent use of the marks on the goods of the respective parties.
It is only when all of the facts of record, properly weighed and carefully considered, do not prove conclusive of one result or another that we should resolve the doubt in favor of the first user. As a mechanism of policy, this practice should be resorted to only when the record provides a reasonable basis for the existence of such a doubt. I do not believe that this is a case which requires application of this policy since the conclusion seems to be quite clear.
I would, therefore, reverse the decision below.