imposition of administrative discipline and criminal punishment are "distinct and separate" even though based on same act, and therefore no double punishment
How later courts described this case
- imposition of administrative discipline and criminal punishment are "distinct and separate" even though based on same act, and therefore no double punishment
- defendant chai’ged with a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 876, mailing a threatening letter; letter quoted in full
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
HASTINGS, Chief Judge
(affirming in part and dissenting in part).
I concur in the majority opinion, except as to that part reversing the judgment of conviction and remanding the case for a new trial.
I agree that we should take a new look at the insanity rule to be applicable in the Seventh Circuit and that henceforth all district courts in the Seventh Circuit should follow the American Law Institute definition as set out in the majority opinion. Such a course of action is in keeping with the times and modern judicial trends.
However, I do not agree that the use of the insanity instruction given by the district court in the trial of this case amounted to prejudicial error requiring a reversal and a new trial.
I would affirm the judgment of conviction and make the application of this case prospective hereafter.
SCHNACKENBERG, Circuit Judge.
I would affirm the judgment of conviction of defendant Shapiro. With respect to Judge Fairchild’s exhaustive consideration of the Davis, M’Naghten and Durham rules and the ALI, definition, it must be remembered that the crucial decision with respect to the mental state of the defendant on trial rests with the jury, after it has heard the evidence and the court’s instructions, and has had an opportunity to personally observe the de *689 fendant. United States v. Igoe, Judge, 7 Cir., 331 F.2d 766, 767-768 (1964).
Fortunately, our society can trust the consensus of the jurors in making this determination, regardless of the diffieulty lawyers and judges may experience in agreeing upon a statement defining insanity as a defense in a criminal trial.