Houston Insulation Contractors Association v. National Labor Relations Board

RIVES, Circuit Judge

(dissenting):

The majority makes clear that the so-called “stay” which it grants is intended to have the force and effect of an injunction. 1 I must respectfully dissent because that seems to me beyond the jurisdiction of this Court.

The Norris-LaGuardia Act 2 deprives the courts of the United States of jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in a case such as this involving or growing out of a labor dispute, unless that jurisdiction has been subsequently conferred by the Labor Management Relations Act. See Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 1962, 370 U.S. 195, 203 , 82 S.Ct. 1328 , 8 L.Ed.2d 440 . When granting appropriate relief provided in section 10 of the latter Act, it is expressly provided that “ * * * the jurisdiction of courts sitting in equity shall not be limited by sections 101-110 and 113-115 of this title.” 29 U.S.C.A. § 160 (h). However, as the Supreme Court observed in Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, supra, that Act permits “injunctions to be obtained, not by private litigants, but only at the instance of the National Labor Relations Board * * *.” ( 370 U.S. at 204 , 82 S.Ct. at 1334 .) 3 See also Amazon Cotton Mill Co. v. Textile Workers Union, 4 Cir. 1948, 167 F.2d 183, 186, 187 . Indeed, Congress expressly rejected a provision in section 12 of the House bill “for injunctions at the request of private persons, rather than by the Board, in cases like these.” 4

Of the sections relied on by the majority (its footnote 1), section 10(e) rer lates to petitions by the Board for enforcement of its order and section 10(f) provides for the grant of temporary relief to the Board but not to a private litigant. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 160 (e) and (f)-

Jurisdiction to issue injunctive relief in a case of this kind, even on the Board’s petition, is strictly limited to the period “pending the final adjudication of the Board with respect to such matter.” Section 10(0 of the Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 160 (l). By its own terms the injunction expired on September 9, 1964, when the Board issued its decision and order dismissing the complaint. 5 **It seems clear *872 to me that this Court has no jurisdiction to grant the private petitioner’s motion for stay and thereby to reinstate the injunction or continue it in force.

I therefore respectfully dissent.

. See the concluding two paragraphs of Judge Brown’s opinion.

. The opening section of that Act reads:

“No court of the United States, as defined in this chapter, shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in a ease involving or growing out of a labor dispute, except in a strict conformity with the provisions of this chapter; nor shall any such restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction be issued contrary to the public policy declared in this chapter.” 29 U.S.C.A. § 101 .

. The only exception is a section not applicable to this case, 29 U.S.C.A § 186

(e), which the Court commented “stands alone in expressly permitting suits for injunctions previously proscribed by the Norris-LaGuardia Act to be brought in the federal courts by private litigants under the Taft-Hartley Act * * ( 370 U.S. 205 , n. 19, 82 S.Ct. 1334 .)

. House Conference Report No. 510, June 3, 1947, on H.R. 3020, U.S.Code Cong. Serv., 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 1947, p. 1164.

. “The final adjudication of the Board” is more limited than “the final disposition of the matters involved,” the language of the district court upon which the majority seizes (its footnote 3) to stretch the terms of the injunction. Any such broadening or extension of the statutory language would have far-reaching effects not intended by Congress.