concluding that “when important testimony is anticipated from certain categories of witnesses, whose official or semi-official status is such that a juror might reasonably be more, or less, inclined to credit their testimony, a query as to whether a juror would have such an inclination is not only appropriate but should be given if requested” (emphasis added)
How later courts described this case
- concluding that “when important testimony is anticipated from certain categories of witnesses, whose official or semi-official status is such that a juror might reasonably be more, or less, inclined to credit their testimony, a query as to whether a juror would have such an inclination is not only appropriate but should be given if requested” (emphasis added)
- holding that a juvenile adjudication is not a "conviction" of a "criminal offense" for purposes of impeachment by prior conviction under D.C.Code § 14-305
- noting that, in the case before it, the military police "performed the functions of police officers even though in a legal sense they had no power to make any more than a citizen's arrest”
- vacating a conviction where the prosecution’s case depended on the credibility of its law enforcement witnesses and the court refused to ask whether potential jurors would give greater credence to the testimony of law enforcement officers
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
WILBUR K. MILLER, Circuit Judge
(concurring).
I join in the foregoing opinion because I think the Sellers case requires reversal. I dissented in that case and still think it is wrong, but I am bound to follow it.
WRIGHT, Circuit Judge
(concurring).
I agree that the conviction should be reversed. In the interest of brevity, I shall simply state my reasons seriatim.
1. The trial court denied a defense motion that defendant be tried as a juvenile without holding a hearing to determine the legal and factual basis for the motion. 11 D.C.Code § 914 (1961); Franklin v. United States, 117 U.S.App. D.C. 331, 336, 330 F.2d 205, 210 (1964); Pee v. United States, 107 U.S.App.D.C. 47, 50-52 , 274 F.2d 556, 559-561 (1959).
2. The trial court refused to ask the jurors on voir dire examination whether they would place more credence in the testimony of a law enforcement officer, merely because he is an officer, than in the testimony of any other witness. Sellers v. United States, 106 U.S.App.D.C. 209 , 271 F.2d 475 (1959).
3. The trial court permitted for impeachment purposes, over objection, the use of alleged statements made by the appellant, a juvenile, while in the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court. Harling v. United States, 111 U.S.App.D.C. 174 , 295 F.2d 161 (1961).
4. The Government was permitted, over objection, to bring out for impeachment purposes that a juvenile defense witness had been committed by the Juvenile Court to the National Training School for Boys on another charge. Pee v. United States, supra.
5. The trial court denied a defense motion for production of a report filed by a police officer who testified for the Government. Such reports are producible under the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 . Clancy v. United States, 365 U.S. 312 , 81 S.Ct. 645 , 5 L.Ed.2d 574 (1961); Campbell v. United States, 365 U.S. 85, 92-99 , 81 S.Ct. 421 , 5 L.Ed.2d 428 (1961).
6. The trial court refused on request to give a missing witness instruction relating to the absence of the prosecuting witness. Graves v. United States, 150 U.S. 118, 121 , 14 S.Ct. 40 , 37 L.Ed. 1021 (1893); Billeci v. United States, 87 U.S.App.D.C. 274, 278-279 , 184 F.2d 394, 398-399 , 24 A.L.R.2d 881 (1950).
The above enumeration of error is sufficient in my judgment to require a new trial.