"Although the estoppel theory was not explicitly argued below, it was plainly encompassed by the pleadings and was clearly a ‘discernible circumstance’ from the record before the court.’’
How later courts described this case
- "Although the estoppel theory was not explicitly argued below, it was plainly encompassed by the pleadings and was clearly a ‘discernible circumstance’ from the record before the court.’’
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Superseded by Fred Tarpley, Sr. v. Raymond J. Greene, 684 F.2d 1 (1982)
Our divided panel opinion in Semaan v. Mumford, 335 F.2d 704, 706 & n. 7 (D.C.Cir.1964), has been superseded by Tarpley and similar cases, as well as by recent Supreme Court decisions regarding summary judgment, see, e.g., Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2555, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (explaining that summary judgment is “properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather…
The opinion
BURGER, Circuit Judge
(dissenting):
Although I agree with the majority that the pleadings of the party opposing summary judgment should be liberally construed and given the benefit of all reasonable inferences of fact, the estoppel theory relied upon by the majority was not presented by appellee Semaan in either the District Court or this court and there is nothing in the record to support a holding on that basis. I see no basis for disturbing the action of the District Court.