"[d]eeply ingrained in the whole tax structure--memorialized now by literally hundreds of tax rulings, Tax and other Court decisions in such numbers as to give some factual credence to what is so often pure fiction that Congress by legislative non-action has put its imprimatur upon a settled administrative practice--is the basic proposition that the cost of going to and from home and an established place of business is a nondeductible expenditure"
How later courts described this case
- "[d]eeply ingrained in the whole tax structure--memorialized now by literally hundreds of tax rulings, Tax and other Court decisions in such numbers as to give some factual credence to what is so often pure fiction that Congress by legislative non-action has put its imprimatur upon a settled administrative practice--is the basic proposition that the cost of going to and from home and an established place of business is a nondeductible expenditure"
- noting that pilot’s relationship towards the vessel is comparable to an independent contractor
- “[d]eeply ingrained in the whole tax structure ... is the basic proposition that the cost of going to and from home and an established place of business is a nondeductible personal expenditure”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
SIMPSON, District Judge
(dissenting) :
The majority opinion (page 498) states that “The Commissioner and (Tax) Court recognized, and allowed deduction for, all of the transportation costs between job sites during the day and also those to and from Galveston. For all practical purposes, the case is like Heuer v. Commissioner, 1959, 32 T.C. 947 , aff’d mem., 5 Cir., 1960, 283 F.2d 865 , upon which, without more, we might well affirm.”
I find myself in accord with this, except that I would omit the word might, and simply say: “we affirm”.
Heuer settled the contentions of the New Orleans Bar Pilots. The doctrine of stare decisis, to my mind, should settle, without more ado, the like contentions of Houston pilots. The disposition made by the majority, learned and thorough as it may appear to be, I view as no more and: no less than a desertion of stare decisis standards for ad hoc standards. I was-taught that a “red cow case”, either for or against you, was dispositive. This premise, by which lawyers live and work and earn their bread, if not dead in this-circuit, appears to be in extremis. I raise one small voice for its return to life and meaning.
The kind of judging done here, the abandonment of established precedent because individual judges disagree with it, leads only to confusion on the part of the bar and the district courts. It encourages increased litigation on both trial and appellate levels. No lawyer can advise his client what the law is; no District Judge or Tax Court Judge can rely with assurance upon precedent.
I served on this case by invitation of the Court of Appeals. Perhaps I should mind my manners and refrain from criticizing not only my betters, but my hosts as well.
But my invitation resulted from the overcrowded docket of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, from its being overpowered by appeals in ever increasing numbers. I am persuaded that many of this Court’s appeals occur only because the bar has by now caught the point and adopted the credo: never mind what the law was last week, let’s see if it’s not different next week. Far too often, without valid and compelling reason, it turns out to be different.
As a district judge then, I hope it is not a breach of civility and proper deference to voice this protest.
I respectfully dissent from all of the majority opinion which does more than affirm on the precedent of Heuer v. Com* missioner, supra.