construing Trademark Act § 2(b) narrowly, applying only to emblems of authority akin to “the Great Seal of the United States, the Presidential Seal, and seals of government departments”
How later courts described this case
- construing Trademark Act § 2(b) narrowly, applying only to emblems of authority akin to “the Great Seal of the United States, the Presidential Seal, and seals of government departments”
- .prior trade name use by Alford sufficient to bar valid registration to subsequent trademark user,. Alfred, in an interference
- the resembling trade name which bars registration need not be inherently distinctive or have acquired secondary meaning
- signature of application constitutes “consent” to registration of one’s own name, portrait, or signature
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
RICH, Judge (dissenting), with whom SMITH, J., joins.
On the basis of the essential facts stated in the court’s opinion bearing on the issue of likelihood of confusion, I respectfully dissent.
For reasons very similar to those which I stated in my opinion for the court in In re General Electric Co., 304 F.2d 688, 691 , 49 CCPA 1186 (1962), I cannot see any real likelihood that those who would purchase Alford’s antenna and coaxial line components at prices from $300 to $50,000 and Alfred’s highly technical microwave and other electronic equipment selling from $1,000 to $9,000 would be confused as to source or anything else by the obvious similarities between ALFORD and ALFRED. There are also obvious differences. Like the marks VULCAN and VULKENE in the General Electric case, one mark, Alfred, is very common as a given name but Alford is relatively uncommon. It immediately strikes the consciousness as distinctly different for that very reason. Compare LUX and SHUX in Lever Brothers Co. v. Producers Chemical Service, 283 F.2d 879 , 48 CCPA 744, wherein we found no likelihood of confusion even on cheap consumer products sold off the supermarket shelf.
Since I see no likelihood of confusion, I see no basis for an interference. I would vacate the board’s decision and remand for dissolution of the interference.