explaining that supplemental pleading “enabl[es] a court to award complete relief, or more nearly complete relief, in one action, and to avoid the cost, delay and waste of separate actions which must be separately tried and prosecuted”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that supplemental pleading “enabl[es] a court to award complete relief, or more nearly complete relief, in one action, and to avoid the cost, delay and waste of separate actions which must be separately tried and prosecuted”
- explaining that supplemental pleading “enables] a court to award complete relief, or more nearly complete relief, ha one action, and to avoid the cost, delay and waste of separate actions which must be separately tried and prosecuted”
- holding that judicial admissions "go to matters of fact” and that "[t]he doctrine of judicial admissions has never been applied to counsel’s statement of his conception of the legal theory of the case”
- declining on remand to construe as judicial admission counsel’s prior legal stipulation disproved on appeal, as informed by modern pleading practice that “a party’s misconception of the legal theory of his case does not work a forfeiture of his legal rights”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
ALBERT V. BRYAN, Circuit Judge
(dissenting in part).
My only disagreement with the opinion of the Court is its failure to allow recovery by the plaintiff of the mortgage interest payments made from the donor’s moneys. I do not think it can be said that the satisfaction of the interest obligation failed to enhance the value of the property in the donee’s hands. To my mind, it increased her equity as much pro tanto as did the payments on the principal. The interest was as much a mortgage debt and lien as the principal. If the interest had not been paid, its accumulation would have decreased the equity of the donee in the property. In this way satisfaction of the interest increased the equity.