holding that the attorney-client privilege applied to a net worth statement prepared by accountants who were retained by the client to assist the attorney in providing legal advice
How later courts described this case
- holding that the attorney-client privilege applied to a net worth statement prepared by accountants who were retained by the client to assist the attorney in providing legal advice
- attorney retained by income taxpayers under investigation by the United States Internal Revenue Service had standing to invoke taxpayers’ privilege against self-incrimination and to suppress as against government’s subpoena cancelled checks and bank statements that taxpayers had turned over to him at his request
- privilege may extend tó document prepared by accountants that describes client’s financial affairs in order to enable attorney to understand client’s financial situation
- Kovel exception applies where attorney advising client for assistance with IRS investigation hired accountant to prepare client’s net worth statement
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by United States v. Conte, 300 F. Supp. 73 (1969)
Judson, therefore, is clearly distinguishable from the case at bar.
The opinion
ROGER T. FOLEY, Senior District Judge
(dissenting).
As stated in the prevailing opinion, the production before the Grand Jury of Items 1, 2 and 3 of the subpoena duces tecum, cancelled checks and bank statements of the commercial accounts of Miriam Y. Stacher, could not be successfully resisted by reason of an attorney-client privilege, and the majority in effect holds that disclosure of Items 1, 2 and 3 of the subpoena could be declined by reason of the invocation of the Fifth Amendment by Mr. Judson as the then acting attorney of Joseph Stacher, the husband of Miriam Stacher.
It is undisputed that the Fifth Amendment was invoked not by either of the Stachers, the clients of Appellee, but by Mr. Judson in behalf of his clients. In discussing the application of the Fifth Amendment, we should keep in mind that it appears from Judge Hall’s oral Order of March 19, 1962, that the portion of *469 the subpoena relating to Items 1, 2 and 3 was quashed solely upon the ground that “ * * * Mr. Judson is [in] the position under the cases to raise the Fifth Amendment on behalf of his clients and on that ground I grant the motion to quash Items 1, 2 and 3.”
As to Item 4, Judge Hall held in his oral opinion:
“The motion to quash the subpoena is granted as to Item No. 4, all of the work papers, memoranda, computations and other accounting work sheets prepared by I. George Goldstein during his visit to Los Angeles, * * *, on the ground that it would be a violation, not only of the attorney-client privilege in that these are part of the attorney’s work papers, but also on the further ground that it would be a violation of the Fifth Amendment. I am satisfied that a lawyer can raise the Fifth Amendment under the circumstances in this case.”
I cannot agree with the conclusion that the attorney Harold Judson, could invoke the Fifth Amendment as attorney for and on behalf of the Stachers.
In the course of his opinion, Mr. Justice Brown, speaking for the Supreme Court, in Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 , 26 S.Ct. 370 , 50 L.Ed. 652, 663 , stated:
“The right of a person under the Fifth Amendment to refuse to incriminate himself is purely a personal privilege of the witness. It was never intended to permit him to plead the fact that some third person might be incriminated by his testimony, even though he were the agent of such person. A privilege so extensive might be used to put a stop to the examination of every witness who was called upon to testify before the grand jury with regard to the doings or business of his principal, whether such principal were an individual or a corporation. * * * The Amendment is limited to a person who shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, and if he cannot set up the privilege of a third person, he certainly cannot set up the privilege of a corporation. * * * Indeed, so strict is the rule that the privilege is a personal one that it has been held in some cases that counsel will not be allowed to make the objection. We hold that the questions should have been answered.”
It affirmatively appears that none of the matters and documents which Appellee Judson was required to produce by virtue of the subpoena duces tecum were the private property of Appellee. Such a circumstance and other questions pertinent here in connection with the application of the Fifth Amendment were considered by the Supreme Court of the United States in United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699 , 64 S.Ct. 1248 , 88 L.Ed. 1542 . There the Supreme Court commented:
“ * * * Moreover, the papers and effects which the privilege protects must be the private property of the person claiming the privilege, or at least in his possession in a purely personal capacity.”
The subject matters of the subpoena duces tecum were in Appellee’s possession in a representative capacity as an attorney or agent of the Stachers and not “in a purely personal capacity.”
Greatly relied upon by Appellee is the case of Application of House, D.C., 144 F.Supp. 95 . In that case Judge Murphy of the Northern District of California, Southern Division, apparently held that an attorney would be permitted to raise claim of privilege against self-incrimination on behalf of his client, in proceeding upon complaint of Government seeking authority to investigate taxpayers’ records for past years to determine if taxpayers had fraudulently attempted to evade payment of income tax for certain years. The Judge in his consideration of the application of the Fifth Amendment stated, in part, as follows, on p. 99 of 144 F.Supp.:
«[4] * * * The substantial question in this case is whether *470 the government is seeking an order for production of documents which would violate the taxpayers’ privilege against self-incrimination as guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.
“The government attacks, first, the standing of the attorneys to invoke the privilege on behalf of their clients. In the citation of cases to support its position, the government has been more zealous than accurate. In support of the statement that ‘this privilege may not be claimed * * * by an attorney on behalf of his client’, the government cited three cases. In Ziegler v. United States, 9 Cir., 1949, 174 F.2d 439 , the court held that where a defendant voluntarily takes the stand and testifies concerning some matter, he is open to cross-examination on that matter, and to the extent that he is subject to such cross-examination, he waives the privilege against self-incrimination with reference to that matter. It was in the context of that waiver of his privilege by the client that the court in the Ziegler case said that ‘appellant’s privilege was personal to him and could not be claimed by some one else for him, not even by his counsel.’ Id., 174 F.2d at page 447 . The Ziegler case is clearly not authority for the proposition that an attorney representing a client and acting pursuant to his instructions may not invoke the privilege for him, in the absence of any waiver on the part of the client.”
In Ziegler v. United States, 174 F.2d 439, 446 , Judge Mathews, speaking for the Court, stated:
“[8, 9] Appellant contends that, in permitting appellee’s counsel to call upon appellant to produce the cheeks and in requiring appellant to produce them, the trial court denied to appellant his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. We reject this contention for the following reasons:
“Appellant voluntarily took the stand and testified as a witness for himself. He thus became subject to cross-examination like any other witness and, to that extent, waived his privilege against self-incrimination. * * *
“[11] It is true that appellant’s counsel objected to the production of the checks, but that objection cannot be regarded as a claim of appellant’s privilege against self-incrimination, for appellant’s privilege was personal to him and could not be claimed by some one else for him, not even by his counsel.”
Whether Judge Mathews’ comment to-the effect that Ziegler’s claim of privilege against self-incrimination was personal to him and could not be claimed by someone else for him, not even by his counsel, was necessary to the decision of the case or mere dictum, it nevertheless was a correct statement of the universally recognized rule that the-privilege accorded by the Fifth Amendment against self-incrimination is personal to the witness and cannot be claimed by someone else for him.
The fact that the witness in the Ziegler case may have waived his right to-immunity under the Fifth Amendment by voluntarily testifying, or waived immunity in some other manner, such waiver by a witness cannot reasonably be held to affect the rule that invocation of the Fifth Amendment must be-made personally by the witness and not bjr another in his behalf. It certainly cannot affect the application of the rule-in this case for the simple reason that Judge Hall quashed the subpoena as to Items 1, 2 and 3 solely by reason of the invocation by Stacher’s attorney of the Fifth Amendment in behalf of Stacher. It must not be implied that because Mr. Judson might properly invoke the attorney-client privilege that he might on behalf of his client invoke the privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment.
In London v. Everett H. Dunbar Corporation, 179 F. 506 , on 510, the fol *471 lowing from the opinion of the Circuit Court of Appeals of the First Circuit:
“The defendant corporation objected to testimony offered for the plaintiff from the treasurer of the defendant corporation. The defendant objected upon the ground, first, that the witness was privileged as an officer of the corporation from giving any testimony tending to connect it with the alleged acts complained of. This was clearly unsound. See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43 , 26 Sup.Ct. 370 , 50 L.Ed. 652 . And, further, that he was privileged from answering any inquiry the answer to which might subject him to a penalty; but this privilege was not claimed by the witness on his own behalf but claimed by counsel for the defendant on behalf of the defendant corporation. It is unnecessary to cite authority to sustain the proposition that such a claim of privilege cannot be asserted by a third person. This exclusion of testimony was erroneous.”
In United States v. Johnson, 76 F.Supp. 538, 540 , Judge Fee, presiding in the Middle District of Pennsylvania, expressed his views on our question as follows:
“[2-6] The privilege against self-incrimination is neither accorded to the passive resistant, nor the person who is ignorant of his rights, nor to one indifferent thereto. It is a fighting clause. Its benefits can be retained only by sustained combat. It cannot be claimed by attorney or solicitor. It is valid only when insisted upon by a belligerent claimant in person.”
Judge Fee cited McAlister v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 90 , 26 S.Ct. 385 , 50 L.Ed. 671 , and other cases in support of his view.
In In re Knickerbocker Steamboat Co., 136 F. 956 , District Judge Adams, of the Southern District of New York, held that “the constitutional privilege of a witness not to be compelled to give evidence which may incriminate him is personal, and cannot be invoked by counsel as a ground of exception to interrogatories propounded in a pleading.”
The three cases just above quoted from were cited evidently with approval by Judge Mathews in Ziegler v. United States, supra.
In In re Brumbaugh, 62-2 USTC, Para. 9521, 9 A.F.T.R.2d 1748 , Judge Byrne, of the Southern District of California, Central Division, had under consideration a case strikingly similar to this case. Judge Byrne’s findings of fact and conclusions of law pertinent here are the following:
“FINDINGS OF FACT
“1) On May 7, 1962, the Grand Jury for the Southern District of California, sitting at Los Angeles, caused a subpoena duces tecum to be served upon G. Vernon Brumbaugh, Esquire, an attorney-at-law and a member of the Bar of this Court.
“2) This subpoena was returnable before the Grand Jury on May 9, 1962, and directed him to bring with him before the Grand Jury:
“ ‘All cancelled checks and bank statements relative to expenses or payments incurred during the years 1959 and 1960, including but not limited to direct or indirect financial transactions between you and Glasser Brothers Pioneer Bail Bondsmen, Irving G. Glassers, Louis Glasser, or any member, employee, or agent of that firm, for said years.’
“3) On May 9, 1962, Mr. Brumbaugh filed the instant motion to vacate and quash or modify the subpoena duces tecum; pending the determination of this motion, his appearance before the Grand Jury was deferred.
“4) The motion was based upon three grounds:
“a. The subpoena called for checks, the production of which might tend to incriminate undis *472 closed professional clients of the witness, in violation of his clients’ privileges against compulsory self-incrimination.
“b. Some of the checks called for by the subpoena were protected by the attorney-client privilege for confidential communications.
“c. The subpoena was exploratory in its nature and failed to specify which checks or transactions are the object of the Grand Jury inquiry.
“5) The witness did not assert that production of these documents might tend to incriminate himself.
“CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
if if
“2) An attomey-at-law may not decline to produce before the Grand Jury documents in his custody on the ground that their production might tend to incriminate one or more of his clients. The privilege against compulsory self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution is a personal privilege. It may not be invoked in behalf of a third party, even if the witness is an attorney and he asserts the priyilege in behalf of his client.
* *****
“ORDER
“Upon the attached Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
“It Is Hereby Ordered, Adjudged, and Decreed that the motion to vacate and quash or modify the Grand Jury’s subpoena duces tecum served upon G. Vernon Brumbaugh on May 7, 1962, for his appearance on May 9, 1962, which motion was filed in this Court on May 9, 1962, is denied.”
In United States v. Willis, D.C.M.D. Georgia, 145 F.Supp. 365 , Judge Bootle held that the privilege against self-incrimination cannot be claimed by attorney or solicitor and is valid only when insisted upon by a belligerent claimant in person. His opinion reviews cases above cited and quoted from, and other cases, not only dealing with the Fifth Amendment, but with the claimed attorney-client privilege for confidential communications. He stated:
“[1] The right of a lawyer not to disclose the confidential communications of his clients and the right against self-incrimination are different rights. Grant v. United States, 227 U.S. 74 , 33 S.Ct. 190 , 57 L.Ed. 423 .
“The facts here in this regard are as they were in United States v. Johnson, D.C., 76 F.Supp. 538, 540 ,. where the Court said:
“ ‘At the hearing before the-judge he did not clearly indicate-that he was standing upon a right against self-incrimination, but indicated he was standing upon the-right of a lawyer not to disclose the confidential communications of his clients. In any event, he did turn the books and papers-over after the hearing before the-judge and did not pursue any other remedy.’
******
“The claim asserted by Mr. Willis-at both hearings is not against incrimination of his client under the Fifth Amendment but is an assertion of the right not to disclose privileged or confidential communications between client and attorney. That claim is untenable. The Supreme Court so decided in Grant v. United States, supra [ 227 U.S. 74 ,. (79) 33 S.Ct. 192 , ( 57 L.Ed. 423 )],. stating concisely, ‘These were independent documents. Even if they had been received by Grant as attorney for purposes of consultation, they could not be regarded as privileged communications.’
“The recent case of Falsone v. United States, 5 Cir., 205 F.2d 734 ,. *473 "739, is also conclusive and controlling on this point:
“ ‘The books and papers of a taxpayer, even though received by an attorney for purposes of consultation, cannot be regarded as privileged communications. (Footnote 9, supra). Grant v. United States, 227 U.S. 74, 79 , 33 S.Ct. 190 , 57 L.Ed. 423 ; 58 Am.Jur., Witnesses, Sec. 501. According to the last cited text, “The reason is obvious; the administration of justice could easily be defeated if a party and his counsel could, by transferring from the one to the other important papers required as evidence in a cause, thereby prevent the court from compelling the production of important papers on a trial.” Or, as more succinctly stated, “If documents are not privileged while in the hands of a party, he does not make them privileged by merely handing them to his counsel.” Edison Electric Light Co. v. United States Electric Lighting Co., C.C.N.Y., 44 F. 294, 297 ; Id., 45 F. 55 . It seems clear, therefore, that, even if we should consider the relation “between a taxpayer and his certified public accountant as confidential as that between client and attorney, the accountant would, nevertheless, be required to produce the books and records of the taxpayer.’
“The Supreme Court in the case of Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 , 71 S.Ct. 438, 440 , 95 L.Ed. 344 , 345, stated:
“ ‘If petitioner desired the protection of the privilege against self-incrimination, she was required to claim it. United States v. Monia, 1943, 317 U.S. 424, 427 , 63 S.Ct. 409, 410 , 87 L.Ed. 376 , [379], The privilege “is deemed waived unless invoked.” United States v. Murdock, 1931, 284 U.S. 141, 148 , 52 S.Ct. 63, 64 , 76 L.Ed. 210 , [212] [ 82 A.L.R. 1376 ]. Furthermore, the decisions of this Court are explicit in holding that the privilege against self-incrimination “is solely for the benefit of the witness,” and “is purely a personal privilege of the witness.”
* * * >
if * # -x- * *
“[7] But even if we were to rule that the attorney can make for his client the claim of privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment, such claim in this case would not prevail. As was pointed out in the Falsone case, supra, 26 U.S.C.A. § 54 (a) requires the taxpayer to keep records and the Commissioner, for the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of any return, is authorized by any officer or employee of the Bureau to examine the taxpayer’s books and records and to require the attendance of the person rendering the return and the taking of his testimony, 26 U.S.C.A. § 3614 . The Falsone case points out further that statutes granting such authorities have been held constitutional as against the contentions that they provide for unreasonable searches and seizures and compel the taxpayer to be a witness against himself.”
In Bouschor v. United States, 8 Cir., 316 F.2d 451, 456 , decided April 22, 1963, Circuit Judge Blackmun, affirming District Judge Dennis Donovan, D.C., 200 F.Supp. 541 , stated:
“[2] The attorney-client privilege. Bouschor’s first point on the merits is that the work papers in question were privileged communications between him and his client O’Brien and that the attorney-client privilege is applicable to prevent their review by the Service.
“We think the point is not well taken. We note that, concededly, (a) the work papers were prepared by the accountants and not by the taxpayer; (b) they were in existence prior to Bouschor’s appearance in the case as attorney for the tax *474 payer; 1 and (c) they had already been reviewed by agents Kaufer and Falconer. Under these circumstances we feel it is unnecessary to decide whether, in connection with an Internal Revenue Service investigation, the privilege is one to be determined under federal law, as the government suggests, citing Falsone v. United States, supra, 5 Cir., 205 F.2d 734, 741-742 , and In re Albert Lindley Lee Memorial Hosp., supra, 2 Cir., 209 F.2d 122, 123 , to which we may add Colton v. United States, 2 Cir., 1962, 306 F.2d 633, 636 , cert. denied 371 U.S. 951 , 83 S.Ct. 505 , 9 L.Ed.2d 499 , or under Minnesota law, Minnesota Statutes Annotated § 595.02, as Bouschor urges, citing Baird v. Koerner, 9 Cir., 1960, 279 F.2d 623, 632 , a case with which the Second Circuit, in Colton v. United States, supra, says flatly, ‘we do not agree’, for we conclude that the result must be the same under either standard. Compare United States v. Summe, E.D.Ky., 1962, 208 F.Supp. 925, 926-927 .
“[3] a. Clearly if the work papers were the property of the accountants in the sense that they were owned by them and not by the taxpayer or Bouschor, no claim of privilege could prevail. This court specifically so held in Sale v. United States, supra, p. 686 of 228 F.2d, where an attorney having possession of an accountant’s work papers was asserting the privilege. In accord are In re Fahey, supra, 6 Cir., 300 F.2d 383, 385 , affirming D.C., 192 F.Supp. 492, 495 , and United States v. Boccuto, D.N.J., 1959, 175 F.Supp. 886 , appeal dismissed, 3 Cir., 274 F.2d 860 . The district court made no finding as to ownership of these papers and on this record we are not fully assured as to their ownership after the delivery by the accountants to Bouschor. When Bouschor wrote the accountants for the papers he asked only ‘if you would send me all of the papers’. Both Stillman and Case in their affidavits say merely that they have ‘relinquished their right(s) to the return or possession of’ them, and we have already noted that the government concedes that rightful indefinite possession of the papers was in Bouschor. But these statements, singly or in the aggregate, do not specifically deny the accountants’ ownership. They are directed rather to possession. Is a trier of fact to imply from them that ownership remains in the accountants or that they have abandoned any property interest in them, or that title in some way has leaped to O’Brien or to Bouschor? Because one claiming the privilege has the burden of establishing it, [citing cases], we have no hesitancy in concluding that this burden has not adequately been sustained here. Compare United States v. Boccuto, supra, pp. 888 and 890 of 175 F.Supp., where an accountant’s affidavit stated that he had turned work papers over to counsel ‘with no intention of retention or any title or belief that I can get them back’, and the court held there was no clear demonstration that the work papers were the property of the taxpayers ‘despite the affidavit filed herein’. We need not decide what the situation would be if the work papers were clearly shown to be the property of the taxpayer or of Bouschor. See Application of House, N.D.Cal., 1956, 144 F.Supp. 95 .
*•»**# *
“[8] The Fifth Amendment. Bouschor claims the right to assert on behalf of O’Brien the Amendment’s protection against self-incrimination. He cites Application of House, supra, N.D.Cal., 1956, 144 F.Supp. 95 . That case does indeed in *475 wolve facts similar to those here. It is authority against Bouschor’s position on the attorney-client issue and on the Fourth Amendment issue but it is favorable to him with respect to the Fifth Amendment. Directly opposing the House case is United States v. Boccuto, supra, D.N.J., 1959, 175 F.Supp. 886 . There the court observed that House was on ‘all fours’, that the taxpayers were not parties, and that it ‘must disagree with the conclusions’ reached in House.
“[9] On this point we agree with Boccuto and disagree with House. We realize that the Fifth Amendment’s provision against self-incrimination ‘must be accorded liberal construction in favor of the right it was intended to secure’. [Citing cases.] But the guarantee against self-incrimination has long been characterized as a personal privilege of the witness. ‘It was never intended to permit him to plead the fact that some third person might be incriminated by his testimony, even though he were the agent of such person’. [Citing cases.] This, it seems to us, is determinative of the Fifth Amendment argument.”
I am of the opinion that the word “personal”, as used in the cases above cited regarding the invocation of the Fifth Amendment, is to be understood in its ordinary meaning and acceptation and not as indicated in the majority opinion.
The above quotations from Bouschor are applicable and in point here. There is a striking similarity between that case and the one we have before us. It is of no moment that the proceeding in this case was initiated by a subpoena duces tecum requiring production of documents before a Grand Jury and was not a proceeding under §§ 7602, 7603 and 7604 of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C.A., to enforce a subpoena requiring the production of certain documents for the examination by the Bureau of Internal Revenue. The interpretation and application of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution would be the same regardless of which of the procedures were followed.
It is apparent that there has been no violation of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution.
Compliance with the subpoena would not be unreasonable and/or oppressive.
From the foregoing I conclude that the District Court erred in granting the motion to quash the subpoena duces tecum as to Items 1, 2 and 3 and also erred in granting the motion to quash as to Item 4.
I would reverse.
. Witli the exception o-f the net worth statement prepared at the request of Mr. Judson, the work papers here were in existence prior to Mr. Judson’s employment.