holding that testimony of informer hired on contingent fee basis not admissible in absence of explanation for use of such system of obtaining testimony
How later courts described this case
- holding that testimony of informer hired on contingent fee basis not admissible in absence of explanation for use of such system of obtaining testimony
- rejecting testimony elicited through an outcome-dependent agreement in keeping with “the duty of the courts in federal criminal cases to require fair and lawful conduct from federal agents in the furnishing of evidence of crimes”
- Information supplied by an informer pursuant to a contingent fee arrangement whereby the informer was to provide evidence against named individuals for crimes not yet committed presented obvious "opportunities for abuse.”
- "Without some such justification or explanation [by the government], we cannot sanction a contingent fee arrangement to produce evidence against particular named defendants as to crimes not yet committed."
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled by United States v. Adalberto Cervantes-Pacheco, Jerry Wayne Nelson and William E. Nelson, 826 F.2d 310 (1987)
See, e.g., United States v. Waterman, 732 F.2d 1527, 1528 (8th Cir.1984) (holding that a witness agreement contingent upon the outcome of the case “hampered the truth-finding function of the jury to a degree which cannot be reconciled with the fair procedures guaranteed by the due process clause of the fifth amendment”), vacated en banc, id. at 1533; Williamson v. United States, 311 F.2d 441, 444 (5th Cir.1962) (reje…
The opinion
JOHN R. BROWN, Circuit Judge
(concurring specially).
I concur in the result and in the Court’s opinion. And it is evident that I agree with much that is said in the dissent.
I do not think, however, that this is an aspect of entrapment. Its kinship to entrapment is not that the act of a Government representative induced the commission of a crime. Rather, it is that the means used to “make” the case are essentially revolting to an ordered society.
For Government to offer a specific sum of money to convict a specified suspect is really more than civilized sensibilities can stand. But in condemning such conduct by the decisive weapon of a reversal, we ought to be aware that there may be equally offensive actions which are less spectacular.
Thus, as the dissent emphasizes so well, the “contingent fee” for a narcotics addict hardly needs to be spelled out in the terms used to trap this moonshiner. To get the stuff to feed his uncontrollable appetite, he knows that he must produce results or he will no longer be “hired” as one euphemistically referred to as a “special employee” but who are better known in the literature of crime as stool pigeons. The pressures which this insatiable appetite generates require that the rights of an accused be carefully protected lest an innocent person become the victim of the “contingent” informer’s overpowering physical dependence on the availability of drugs. This may well require inquiry into the methods used, the circumstances under which an addicted informer is utilized, the nature of the instructions given, the standards laid down to test the sufficiency of his performance upon which his reward is to be based, or the like.
What we hold is that, recognized as is the role of informer in the enforcement of criminal laws, there comes a time when enough is more than enough— it is just too much. When that occurs, the law must condemn it as offensive whether the method used is refined or crude, subtle or spectacular.