“One cannot read the wording of section 112 without appreciating that strong language has been used for the purpose of compelling complete disclosure”
How later courts described this case
- “One cannot read the wording of section 112 without appreciating that strong language has been used for the purpose of compelling complete disclosure”
- "The descriptions in patents are not addressed to the public generally, to lawyers or to judges, but, as section 112 says, to those skilled in the art to which the invention pertains or with which it is most nearly connected."
- “[DJescriptions in patents are not addressed to the public generally, to lawyers or to" judges, but . . to those skilled in the art to which the invention pertains or with which it is most nearly connected.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled on other grounds by Application of David Neville Kirk and Vladimir Petrow, 376 F.2d 936 (1967)
47 C.C.P.A. 1031 , 280 F.2d 172, 181 (1960), overruled on other grounds by Application of Kirk, 376 F.2d 936, 944
The opinion
WORLEY, Chief Judge
(dissenting).
Although the present majority opinion is a substantial improvement over that handed down when this appeal was first heard, I regret that I am still unable to reconcile my views of the standards of patentability with those expressed by the majority.
The majority says “The grand objective of the patent system, as stated in the Constitution, is to promote the progress of the useful arts.” If that reference is to Article I of Section 8, then I respectfully suggest it is too loose a paraphrase of such a basic and controlling force in our patent system. The Constitution actually says: “The Congress shall have Power * * * To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” I agree that section embodies the “grand objective” of the patent system, but am unable to agree that appellants have here attained that objective, nor have they satisfied the specific statutory implementation thereof, as Judge Kirkpatrick so well points out in his dissenting opinion.
Patent rights are valuable rights and should be earned by those who seek patent monopolies. But the net effect of granting a patent here will be to give appellants an unearned monopoly on a substantial area in the field of chemistry, and prevent others, unless they are willing to risk infringement, from also experimenting in a field which should remain open to all.
It would also seem that another result of the majority view will be to. encourage research workers to file patent applica--tions prematurely on all new compounds they might develop, but to penalize those who seek to first ascertain patentable uses for new compounds before filing applications.
Although, when this appeal was first heard, I was not convinced appellants had clearly established their right to a patent, I was erroneously inclined to resolve the doubt in their favor. However, if the majority opinion serves as a precedent, it seems inevitable that in the future the public will be exchanging fixed patent rights for a diminishing quid pro quo far below the standards contemplated by the Constitution and the statutes.
I would affirm.