a statute forbidding the sale of alcohol to an intoxicated person exists for the protection of any member of the public who might be injured or damaged as a result of the drunkenness to which the particular sale of alcohol contributes
How later courts described this case
- a statute forbidding the sale of alcohol to an intoxicated person exists for the protection of any member of the public who might be injured or damaged as a result of the drunkenness to which the particular sale of alcohol contributes
- sale in violation of criminal statute held to be basis for common-law negligence claim
- sale in violation of criminal statute held' to be basis for common-law claim
- “Every person has a general duty to use due care ... not to injure others.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
KNOCH, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
I find myself in agreement with my distinguished colleagues that neither the Michigan nor the Illinois Dram Shop Acts apply and that the Michigan common law governs. I am also in agreement that under Illinois law the Illinois Dram Shop Act cannot be said to have any extraterritorial coverage. Eldridge v. Don Beachcomber, Inc., 342 Ill.App. 151 , 95 N.E.2d 512 , 22 A.L.R.2d 1123 .
The majority holds that the common law by virtue of the penal statute (Sec. 131, Ch. 43, 1951 Illinois Revised Statutes, which makes sales of liquor to intoxicated persons unlawful) gives a civil right of action in tort against the sellers. With this conclusion I cannot agree.
It should be noted that-this is a penal statute providing for the punishment of those selling to intoxicated persons and thereby is of general good to the public. It confers no specific rights to private individuals.
“It was not a tort at common law to either sell or give intoxicating liquor to ‘a strong and able-bodied man,’ and it can be said safely, that it is not anywhere laid down in the books that such act was ever held, at common law, to be culpable negligence that would impose legal liability for damages upon the vendor or donor of such liquor.” Cruse v. Aden, 1889, 127 Ill. 231, 234 , 20 N.E. 73 , 74.
I cannot accept the distinction made— that an intoxicated person is not an “able-bodied man” — because that would, in effect, eliminate any reason for the enactment of the Dram Shop Act.
The majority opinion states that “If the common law does not cover the situation before us, there is actually no law applicable * * * nature abhors a vacuum; so does the law.”
*327 Prior to the enactment of the Dram Shop Act, tavern keepers and owners had no liability. By the same reasoning, one can say that a total and absolute vacuum prevailed as to them. However, the common law has always held accountable those responsible for direct injury to the person or property of another. This is true in the instant case. There is no bar to proceeding against the driver and the owner of the car in question.
It may be socially desirable to hold tavern keepers and owners responsible under the circumstances in this case, but that result, I believe, should be achieved through Congressional act, rather than by judicial interpretation.
The trial court’s order dismissing the complaint not only as to the owners but also as to the tavern keepers is correct and should be affirmed.