National Airlines, Inc. v. Beryl Whiteman Stiles, Beryl Whiteman Stiles v. National Airlines, Inc.

*407 CAMERON, Circuit Judge

(dissenting) .

The record before us does not, in my opinion, sufficiently present the issues of law the court below was bound to consider in reaching its decision to enable us intelligently to pass upon the contentions of the parties. This is so because of the complete failure of the trial court to find the facts and state separately its conclusions of law as required by the Rules of Practice in Admiralty and Maritime Cases. 1 The court below heard the evidence and the arguments on August 4, 1958, and held the case under study until October 17 when it filed its decree, which merely awarded judgment in favor of Mrs. Stiles and against National Airlines “in the full sum of $250,000.00 * * * ”

The amount of the award in this case would depend necessarily upon how the court decided several questions of law as to which the parties took sharp issue. In fact, as I understand appellant’s contentions, it does not attack the court’s exercise of its discretion in fixing the amount of the damages, but only the inclusion of elements of recovery not permitted by law. The extremely large verdict rendered by the trial court could only be justified, as appellant contends, by its finding all of the facts in favor of the widow and concluding all of the questions of law in her favor. We are left without any inkling of the court’s decision on these points of law. To pass upon its verdict and judgment amounts, therefore, in my opinion, to judging in the dark.

Among the sharply contested issues of law before the trial court was whether appellee was entitled to recover one-half of her husband’s prospective earnings as a matter of right. 2 The opinion does not decide this question, i.e., whether in a suit under this Federal Statute, which fixes the limits of recovery, the Louisiana State Statute would control or be entitled to consideration; but, from the above quotation, it seems to accept ap-pellee’s position with respect to it. The two cases cited in support of the majority’s reference to this problem are tax cases. I find no authority in appellee’s brief or in the Court’s opinion for the application here of the Louisiana Statute. From the oral argument it would be assumed that appellee takes the position that, if the fact-finder concluded that decedent would have averaged net earnings of $50,000 per year for the period of his expectancy, it should automatically award to the widow one-half of that amount by way of damages.

If such be the law, recovery under this federal act by a beneficiary living in Louisiana would vastly exceed recovery by a beneficiary of a person living just across the state line in Mississippi. Such a result contravenes, in my opinion, all of the teachings of the cases, that this series of acts, of which the Federal Employers’ Liability Act is one *408 of the first and the one most often encountered, was enacted to insure uniformity of treatment to residents of all of the states unaffected by the different rules applying in the several states. 3

Whether the award to which appellee was entitled was limited to contributions decedent would probably have made to her based upon experience and any probative evidence as to future earnings; whether the amount should include 4 “such accumulation, both as to her one-half under community property rules, and also of his part as well, [which] might ultimately be inherited by the wife;” whether the discount rate should be four per cent, as contended by appellant, in arriving at the present cash value of “the pecuniary loss” the widow sustained by the death of decedent, all present questions of law earnestly argued by both parties and supported in most instances by respectable authority. The trial court was bound to resolve these questions of law and under Admiralty Rules it was required to set down its conclusions and the facts to which it applied them in reaching the result upon which judgment was predicated.

At the hearing covered by the record before us the only issue presented was the amount to be awarded appellee. Damages are commonly fixed by juries and the elements which they are entitled to consider are carefully spelled out in the court’s charge. Where damages are awarded by the court, it can, under said Rules, do no less than include in its findings and conclusions the elements of damages upon which the award is based. The failure of the court below so to do requires, in my opinion, that its judgment be reversed and a fortiori requires that we do not put our approval upon it. Admiralty Rule 46% made it obligatory upon the court to enter its findings of fact and conclusions of law, and I know of no practice which puts a litigant in default for not submitting requested findings, unless requested by the court to do so. 5 Rule 52(a), Fed.R.Civ.P. 28 U.S. C.A. specifically exempts the parties from any obligation to request findings of fact and conclusions of law, and Professor Moore states, 7 Moore’s Federal Practice, 2d Edition, page 4431, that “it has. been generally held that such Admiralty Rules should be given the same construction as that given to identical Rules of Civil Procedure.”

We recently 6 vacated a judgment and! remanded an admiralty case to the district court solely because of its failure to make findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by Rule 46%, quoting from a Supreme Court decision stating “that there must be findings, stated either in the court’s opinion or separately, which are sufficient to indicate the factual basis for the ultimate conclusion.”

I am unable also to go with the majority on the matter of interest. The authorities it cites are not to me convincing. As far as I am advised, it has always been the law that judgments for unliquidated damages do not carry interest prior to their rendition, 7 and that interest will not be allowed on damages for *409 personal injuries. 8 I find nothing in the majority opinion or in the briefs of counsel to warrant so radical a departure from so well established a principle. If Congress had intended so drastic a -change, it would have said so in the statute. Funkhouser v. J. B. Preston Co., 290 U.S. 163, 168-169 , 54 S.Ct. 134 , 78 L.Ed. 243 , and Louisiana & Arkansas R. Co. v. Pratt, 5 Cir., 1944, 142 F.2d 847 , 153 A.L.R. 851 .

For these reasons I respectfully dissent.

. Rule 46%, 28 U.8.O.A. provides tlie following :

“Findings of fact and conclusions of law. In deciding cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction the court of first instance shall find the facts specially and .state separately its conclusions of law thereon; and its findings and conclusions shall be entered of record and, if an appeal is taken from the decree, shall be included by the clerk in the record which is certified to the appellate court under rule 49.”

. Appellee thus states her position: “First, the Airline’s computations are based only on the cash contributions which Mrs. Stiles actually received from her husband during his lifetime. The Airline takes no account of (a) Mrs. Stiles’ community property half interest, in her own right, in all of her husband’s earnings, or (b) the fact that Mrs. Stiles as her husband’s sole heir, would have inherited the balance of his saved earnings at his natural death.”

The majority refers to this question in these words: “Such a contention would deprive the trial court of the right to give any effect to the community property laws of the state of Louisiana which have the effect of declaring that one half of the husband’s current income belongs to the wife. See Bender v. Pfaff, 282 U.S. 127 , 51 S.Ct. 64 , 75 L.Ed. 252 ; Succession of Wiener, 203 La. 649 , 14 So.2d 475 .”

. The general law under F.E.L.A. is thus stated in 35 Am.Jur., Master and Servant, § 519, pp. 949-950: “While there has been considerable controversy as to the measure and amount of damages recoverable in an action under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, it is now settled that the measure of damages is to be determined according to the provisions ■of the Act itself and the general common law as administered by the federal courts, unaffected by state legislation or the decisions of state courts. This is true :in respect both of actions by the employee for his own personal injuries and in actions by the representatives of an employee who is killed or who dies from inj'uries received, for the benefit of the next of kin designated in the statute.”

. As the maj'ority seems to think.

. The Plow City, 3 Cir., 1941, 122 F.2d 816, 819 .

. Victory Towing Co., Inc., v. Bordelon. 1955, 219 F.2d 540, 541 .

. 15 Am.Jur., Damages, § 161, pp. 579— 580.

. “The general rule is that interest will not be allowed on damages for personal injuries. Thus, interest is improperly-awarded for personal injuries caused by negligence or for personal injuries against a master, where the party causing the injury could not be benefited. * * * ” 15 Am.Jur., Damages, § 171, pp. 587-588.