withholding testimony tending to show that defendant was in such condition because of alcohol or drugs or both, as to be incapable of entertaining a specific intent or of deliberation
How later courts described this case
- withholding testimony tending to show that defendant was in such condition because of alcohol or drugs or both, as to be incapable of entertaining a specific intent or of deliberation
- In this first degree murder trial in which the defendant was given the death penalty, the defendant had contended that he was entirely too drunk to form the necessary premeditation for first degree murder. One arresting officer out of four had made a preliminary statement to the prosecution that four hours after the murder, the defendant appeared to be drunk. That officer was not used at time of trial, and the other three were. The case was reversed and a new trial was granted.
- noting that testimony from a police officer is likely to be considered very persuasive by a jury
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
KALODNER, Circuit Judge
(concurring).
I agree with my brethren that under the special circumstances existing in this case the District Court erred in denying relief to the accused.
In my opinion since the Commonwealth introduced testimony by the Triangle Bar bartender and Dubis, one of the arresting officers, at the accused’s trial, that he was not under the influence of liquor at the time of his arrest some four hours after the shooting and that it further stated to the jury that it “could call a few other police officers who would corroborate what has already been testified to” (by the bartender and Dubis) that it committed fundamental unfairness to the accused by withholding Heagy’s available testimony that the accused was “under the influence of liquor”. The Commonwealth’s present contention that Heagy’s testimony is irrelevant because it is too remote doesn’t square with its introduction of the bartender’s and Dubis’ testimony dealing with the same “remote” period. The Commonwealth cannot have its cake and eat it too. If, under its view, testimony of sobriety four hours after the shooting was relevant at the trial, certainly Heagy’s testimony to the contrary was also relevant.
For this specific reason alone I would reverse, because it cannot be gainsaid that the Commonwealth’s suppression of Heagy’s testimony constituted fundamental unfairness under the circumstances recited.
I have stated this view because in my opinion Heagy’s testimony would ordinarily have been inadmissible since it related to a time four hours after the shooting occurred and its suppression (absent the offering by the Commonwealth of testimony as to the accused’s sobriety four hours after the shooting) would not have constituted fundamental unfairness by reason of its lack of relevance to establish the accused's sobriety *769 or drunkenness at the time of the shooting.
While the Pennsylvania courts have not declared themselves on this issue of relevance of testimony as to sobriety or drunkenness four hours after a crime is committed other jurisdictions have uniformly ruled such evidence inadmissible. 1
. In Jordan v. Commonwealth, 181 Va. 490 , 25 S.E.2d 249 , evidence of intoxication one-half hour after killing was ex-eluded; in Goodman v. State, 20 Ala.App. 392 , 102 So. 486 , evidence of intoxication as part of res gestae one hour after-wards was excluded; in Pollock v. State, 136 Wis. 136 , 116 N.W. 851 court held it could be shown that Commonwealth witness was intoxicated at time of killing but could not show intoxication one and one-half hours afterward; in Raynor v. Wilmington, S. C. R. Co., 129 N.C. 195 , 39 S.E. 821 , evidence four hours after killing was excluded.