stating that "[t]he basic requirement is that the officers who are commanded to search be able from the particular description of the search warrant to identify the specific place for which there is probable cause to believe that a crime is being committed. This requirement may be satisfied by giving the address of the building and naming the person whose apartment is to be searched" (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)
How later courts described this case
- stating that "[t]he basic requirement is that the officers who are commanded to search be able from the particular description of the search warrant to identify the specific place for which there is probable cause to believe that a crime is being committed. This requirement may be satisfied by giving the address of the building and naming the person whose apartment is to be searched" (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)
- holding that the search of an entire building consisting of four apartments was unconstitutional where the officers were unable to determine which, if any, of the apartments belonged to the targets of the search
- wherein the court noted that even if no innocent persons actually suffered from an unjustified search, the warrant would still be invalid because "[t]he validity of the warrant is dependent on the facts shown in the affidavit before the issuing authority"
- government informer was familiar with the inside of the building, which was subdivided into apartments, and the police apparently discovered that fact before entering the building
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by United States v. Eli Gusan, 549 F.2d 15 (1977)
In United States v. Lee, 448 F.2d 604, 605-06 (7th Cir. 1971), we distinguished Hinton in a case where the target gambling operation occupied the second floor but access was gained through the first floor and the warrant encompassed both floors.
The opinion
LINDLEY, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
I regret that I must dissent. First, I think there can be no question as to probable cause for issuance of the search warrant, for the reason that the affidavit upon which it was based contained a positive, unequivocal statement that the affiant had personally observed narcotics, ■ — cocaine and heroin, — being sold on the premises involved, by three different women, the day before the warrant was served. Surely this constituted probable cause for believing that the property was being “used as the means of committing a criminal offense” within the language of the governing rule. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure No. 41, 18 U.S.C.A.
In the second place, I am unable to convince myself that there was anything unreasonable in the issuance or service of the warrant. Following the language of the affidavit upon which it was based, it directed search of the premises where the sales of narcotics had been observed, viz., the basement and three floors of a dwelling at 6423 Champlain Avenue in Chicago. This was a definite designation of the property to be searched. Upon arrival the officers found different families residing on the different floors^ They searched the building, finding there the defendants whose first names were among those mentioned in the affidavit as “Savannah” and “Sue” in illegal possession of narcotics.
I see nothing in these facts justifying a finding of an unreasonable search. In United States v. Lepper, D.C., 288 F. 136 , a warrant was directed to a dwelling, parts of which were occupied by different tenants. In United States v. Wihinier, D.C., 284 F. 528 , the building searched was an apartment building. In Kenney v. United States, 81 U.S.App.D.C. 259 , 157 F.2d 442 , the structure consisted of two apartments. In United States v. Nagle, D.C., 34 F.2d 952 , the building was a hotel, and some of the rooms were occupied by permanent tenants. In Fry v. United States, 9 Cir., 9 F.2d 38 , the property was a rooming house. In all these cases the courts upheld the reasonableness of the search. Here one of the defendants owned the premises; the other was a tenant. Both, according to the affidavit, were selling narcotics in the specific premises named. To my mind, to hold this warrant and the search in pursuance thereof unreasonable is to impose undue limitations upon the constitutional provision forbidding unreasonable searches. I would affirm the judgment.