holding that “employees . . . engaged in the production of goods for subsequent sale in interstate commerce,” were not exempted from the FAA because “while their activities will undoubtedly affect interstate commerce they are not acting directly in the channels of commerce itself”
How later courts described this case
- holding that “employees . . . engaged in the production of goods for subsequent sale in interstate commerce,” were not exempted from the FAA because “while their activities will undoubtedly affect interstate commerce they are not acting directly in the channels of commerce itself”
- holding that the exclusionary language of § 1 should only apply to those “workers who are actually engaged in the movement of interstate or foreign commerce or in work so closely related thereto as to be in practical effect part of it”
- determining that seamen and railroad workers “were engaged directly in commerce,” and that the intent of § 1 was to include only those other classes of workers who were “likewise engaged directly in commerce”
- noting that Congress "must have had [the FELA] in mind" when drafting the residual clause in Section 1 of the FAA, given that Congress "incorporat[ed] almost exactly the same phraseology" into the FAA
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
BIGGS, Chief Judge (concurring).
This court should expressly overrule its decisions in Amalgamated Ass'n v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 3 Cir., 1951, 192 F.2d 310, 313 , and Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines v. Amalgamated Ass’n, 3 Cir., 1952, 193 F.2d 327 , holding that a collective bargaining agreement is a “contract of employment” within the purview of Section 1 of the Act. A collective bargaining agreement is not a contract of employment. Cf. J. I. Case Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 1944, 321 U.S. 332, 334-336 , 64 S.Ct. 576 , 88 L.Ed. 762 . The exclusionary provisions of Section 1 are therefore inapplicable under the circumstances at bar.
The majority view, limiting, in this case, the exclusionary provisions of Section 1 to contracts of employment of workers engaged in transporting goods in foreign or interstate commerce, is too *455 narrow to be supportable. Tbe exclusion embraces contracts of workers engaged in the production of goods for interstate commerce.
I cannot accept the plaintiff’s contention that the legislative history of the Act compels the conclusion that the Act was intended to apply to commercial disputes only and not to labor disputes. The legislative history is of a kind that possesses little weight and should not be considered. Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 1921, 254 U.S. 443, 474 , 41 S.Ct. 172 , 65 L.Ed. 349 , and United States v. Kung Chen Fur Co., 1951, 188 F.2d 577, 584 , 38 Cust. & Pat.App. 107. The face of the statute must control the relief to be granted under it.
I agree with the majority that if the collective bargaining agreement provides for arbitration of the issues raised by the complaint and if Local 427 is not in default, it would be entitled to a stay under Section 3 of the Act. I, therefore, join in vacating the judgment of the court below and remanding the case for further proceedings.
Judge MARIS has authorized me to say that he agrees with me that a collective bargaining agreement is not a “contract of employment” within the purview of Section 1 of Title 9, properly interpreted.