holding that plaintiffs’ allegations that defendants “must have been aware of her political affiliation because she was a well-known supporter of the NPP in the community, had held a previous trust position under the NPP administration, and was allegedly demoted shortly after the PDP assumed power” was not adequate to show that political affiliation was a substantial factor in the challenged action
How later courts described this case
- holding that plaintiffs’ allegations that defendants “must have been aware of her political affiliation because she was a well-known supporter of the NPP in the community, had held a previous trust position under the NPP administration, and was allegedly demoted shortly after the PDP assumed power” was not adequate to show that political affiliation was a substantial factor in the challenged action
- holding that claim that defendants were aware of plaintiffs political affiliation because she was a well-known NPP supporter in the community and held a trust position with the NPP administration was legally insufficient, to establish that defendants were aware of her affiliation; plaintiff failed to adduce any evidence that defendants knew her party affiliation
- holding that the fact that plaintiff was a well-known supporter of the opposing party, had held previous trust positions under said party’s administration, and that was allegedly demoted after they assumed power, was insufficient to show that defendants knew about her political affiliation, and that said affiliation was the motivating factor for her demotion
- recognizing that a “ ‘prima facie case for political discrimination may be built on circumstantial evidence’ ” so long as plaintiffs have “generated ‘the specific facts necessary to take the asserted claim out of the realm of speculative, general allegations’ ” (quoting Kauffman v. P.R. Tel. Co., 841 F.2d 1169, 1173 (1st Cir.1988))
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
BOUDIN, Chief Judge,
(Concurring in the judgment).
The panel opinion persuades me that the grant of summary judgment should be sustained. But my reservations as to certain of the quotations from, and glosses upon, two prior decisions dealing with the issue of Spanish language documents under 48 U.S.C. § 864 (2000) are so firm as to preclude an unqualified concurrence in the panel opinion.