holding that, even if a supervisor lacks actual knowledge of censurable conduct, he may be liable for the foreseeable consequences of such conduct if (1) he would have known of it but for his deliberate indifference or willful blindness, and (2) he had the power and authority to alleviate it
How later courts described this case
- holding that, even if a supervisor lacks actual knowledge of censurable conduct, he may be liable for the foreseeable consequences of such conduct if (1) he would have known of it but for his deliberate indifference or willful blindness, and (2) he had the power and authority to alleviate it
- stating that summary judgment "will be appropriate if the nonmovant elects to rest upon some combination of 'conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation'" (quoting Medina-Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds - 10 - Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir. 1990))
- holding that a supervisor may be liable for the “foreseeable consequences” of his conduct or policy judgments, even without actual knowledge of a civil rights violation, if he would have known but for his “deliberate indifference or willful blindness”
- explaining that a showing of gross negligence on a supervisory official’s part “can signify deliberate indifference and serve as a basis for supervisory liability if it is causally connected to the actions that work the direct constitutional injury”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
BOWNES, Senior Circuit Judge,
separately concurring.
I concur in the result reached in this case and commend the writing judge for his scholarly and clearly written discussion of supervisory liability.
I concur in the result reached on the appellate jurisdiction question, but I do not agree that the issue was “excruciatingly close.” I think the district court was clearly correct in finding that “there is no just reason for delay.”