explaining that it likely would be constitutional for the Board to “require permits for demonstrations on the sidewalk [at the foot of the steps on the East Front of the Capitol], limit the duration of such demonstrations, restrict the number of individuals who may demonstrate simultaneously, require that demonstrators present bags and other personal possessions to police officers for screening, or prohibit activities likely to attract large crowds”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that it likely would be constitutional for the Board to “require permits for demonstrations on the sidewalk [at the foot of the steps on the East Front of the Capitol], limit the duration of such demonstrations, restrict the number of individuals who may demonstrate simultaneously, require that demonstrators present bags and other personal possessions to police officers for screening, or prohibit activities likely to attract large crowds”
- stating that "courts have long recognized that [the areas in question] meet the definition of a traditional public forum: They have traditionally been open to the public, and their intended use is consistent with public expression"
- finding that although regulatory qualifiers "cannot begin to satisfy the narrow tailoring requirement” the regulation was not grossly unconstitutional because the regulation made some attempt to narrow its breadth
- granting qualified immunity to officers who arrested plaintiff for distributing leaflets in a “no-demonstration zone” on the Capitol Grounds because while the law contained “profound flaws” and was “astonishing[ly]” broad it was not “so grossly and flagrantly unconstitutional that the officers should have recognized its flaws”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
SILBERMAN, Senior Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I concur in the court’s opinion. We are certainly bound by Jeannette Rankin Brigade v. Chief of Capitol Police, 342 F.Supp. 575 (D.D.C.1972) (three judge panel), aff'd, 409 U.S. 972 , 93 S.Ct. 311 , 34 L.Ed.2d 236 (1972). However, I think it is distinctly possible that the later Supreme Court case, United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 , 103 S.Ct. 1702 , 75 L.Ed.2d 736 (1983), particularly the Court’s implicit rejection of Justice Marshall’s position that the whole of the Supreme Court’s grounds are a traditional public forum, betokens a more sympathetic reception to the government’s arguments. To be sure, Jeannette Rankin Brigade was summarily affirmed, but the Court rarely considers itself bound by the reasoning of its prior opinions— which is why I have referred to it as a “noncourt court,” see United States v. Moore, 110 F.3d 99, 102 (D.C.Cir.1997) (Silberman, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) — let alone a summary affirmance. (Of course, the Court’s reluctance to offend Congress would not be irrelevant.)
*49 In light of my doubts as to how this case win be received by the Supreme Court if certiorari is granted, I join my colleagues’ treatment of the Bivens claim. However, I am inclined to think that under applicable immunity law each of the police officer’s conduct should be judged as if he were the lawyer for the Capitol Police.