holding that it was appropriate to presume that as a result of race discrimination those class members who were experienced rodmen suffered emotional distress by having to subject themselves to an unnecessary training program for up to two years before being permitted to take union entrance exam and therefore damages award was supported and appropriate
How later courts described this case
- holding that it was appropriate to presume that as a result of race discrimination those class members who were experienced rodmen suffered emotional distress by having to subject themselves to an unnecessary training program for up to two years before being permitted to take union entrance exam and therefore damages award was supported and appropriate
- “[C]ourt[s] must, ‘as nearly as possible, recreate the conditions and relationships that would have been, had there been no unlawful discrimination.’” (quoting Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 372 (1977)
- To share in relief, class members “must make some showing that they were potential victims of the discriminatory employment practices”
- noting the awards ranged from $2,500 to $25,000
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
SILBERMAN, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
We have strained hard — perhaps too hard — to decide as much of this case as we could. As our background section indicates, the district court’s interminable delays are inexcusable and have caused a great hardship to the parties, particularly the class. I am terribly concerned that our remand to this district judge is equivalent to dropping the case into a well, and, therefore, we should be prepared to grant extraordinary relief if there is further unjustified delay.
It seems to me that all the district judges — the whole district court — should assume responsibility for unwarranted delays in the processing of cases. The court of appeals has a rule, the September Rule, which has been vigorously enforced, that prevents any judge from sitting on cases in the fall if he or she has more than three assigned majority opinions outstanding over six months. I see no reason why the district court could not adopt an analogous rule, more tailored to its circumstances, that would force district judges to process cases in a timely fashion or else be disqualified. The court of appeals can only act episodically as cases are brought to us; it is not our responsibility to supervise district judges.