explaining that the deferential standard of § 2254(d) still applies even if the state court did not issue an opinion or explain its reasoning for denying habeas relief and that "[w]hen a federal claim has been presented to a state court and the state court has denied relief [without explanation], it may be presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any indication or state-law procedural principles to the contrary”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that the deferential standard of § 2254(d) still applies even if the state court did not issue an opinion or explain its reasoning for denying habeas relief and that "[w]hen a federal claim has been presented to a state court and the state court has denied relief [without explanation], it may be presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any indication or state-law procedural principles to the contrary”
- holding that “petitioner’s burden still must be met by showing there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief,” and reviewing court “must determine what arguments or theories supported or ... could have supported[] the state court’s decision[,] and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of [the Supreme Court]”
- holding that the state habeas court’s determination that trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to investigate and present expert testimony on certain blood evidence because it was “well within the bounds of a reasonable judicial determination for the state court to conclude that defense counsel could follow a strategy that did not require the use of experts regarding the pool in the doorway of [one of the victim’s] bedroom”
- holding that the AED-PA requires federal habeas courts to review state court decisions with “deference and latitude,” and “[a] state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s decision” (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664, 124 S.Ct. 2140, 158 L.Ed.2d 938 (2004))
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Limited by Jeffery Lee v. Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections, 726 F.3d 1172 (2013)
We reject Lee’s attempt to limit Harrington to state court decisions with no reasoned opinion at all.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Nicole Harris v. Sheryl Thompson, 698 F.3d 609 (2012)
See Sussman v. Jenkins, 642 F.3d 532, 534 (7th Cir.2011) (Ripple, J., in chambers) (denying motion to stay mandate and concluding that Richter presumption was inapplicable where state appellate court issued an opinion but did not address the constitutional question); see also Sussman v. Jenkins, 636 F.3d 329, 350 (7th Cir.2011) (underlying opinion).
Distinguished by Sussman v. Jenkins, 642 F.3d 532 (2011)
There are several reasons why this passage from Harrington is inapplicable to the present case.
The opinion
Justice Ginsburg,
concurring in the judgment.
In failing even to consult blood experts in preparation for the murder trial, Richter’s counsel, I agree with the Court of Appeals, “was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 687 (1984). The strong force of the prosecution’s case, however, was not significantly reduced by the affidavits offered in support of Richter’s habeas *114 petition. I would therefore not rank counsel’s lapse “so serious as to deprive [Richter] of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” Ibid. For that reason, I concur in the Court’s judgment.