Opinion

Vondrak v. City of Las Cruces

  • 535 F.3d 1198
  • 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 16543
  • 2008 WL 2967656
Court
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Filed
Aug 5, 2008
Status
Published
Author
Hartz
On the bench
Tacha, Briscoe, Hartz
Cited by
121 cases

holding police officers were not entitled to qualified immunity on Fourth Amendment 13 excessive force claim where they ignored arrestee’s complaints that handcuffs were unduly tight, the arrestee suffered a permanent actual injury, and the constitutional right was clearly established

How later courts described this case

  • holding police officers were not entitled to qualified immunity on Fourth Amendment 13 excessive force claim where they ignored arrestee’s complaints that handcuffs were unduly tight, the arrestee suffered a permanent actual injury, and the constitutional right was clearly established
  • stating that, in the context of an excessive force claim, “[i]t is ‘clearly established’ that all law enforcement officials have an affirmative duty to intervene to protect the constitutional rights of citizens from infringement by other law enforcement officers in their presence”
  • concluding that a plaintiff established a constitutional violation when tightened handcuffs caused permanent nerve damage in plaintiff’s wrist
  • finding genuine issue of fact existed whether plaintiff suffered “actual injury” when, in addition to unduly tight handcuffing, plaintiff provided evidence that he might have permanent nerve damage in his wrists

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

HARTZ, Circuit Judge,

concurring in part, dissenting in part:

I join all of the majority opinion except that I would affirm the denial of qualified immunity on the illegal-arrest claim against McCants. As the majority opinion states, Vondrak told McCants that he had “bought a beer about three or four hours earlier, and consumed approximately one-third of it.” Op. at 1201. I do not think that Vondrak’s statement in itself (and there is nothing else to support McCants) gave McCants reasonable suspicion, or even arguable reasonable suspicion, to believe that Vondrak was violating the law. Perhaps McCants, through training or experience, had come to learn (1) that a driver could be impaired by the drinking described by Vondrak or, more likely, (2) that someone who admitted to the drinking described by Vondrak (yet, like him, displayed no sign of intoxication, such as alcohol on the breath or erratic driving) had likely imbibed more than described and was impaired in driving. But there was no such evidence in this case.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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