holding that “where . . . there is a ‘new judgment intervening 22 23 1 That matter remains pending on appeal in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. USCA Case No. 14-99009 1 between the two habeas petitions,’ [the petition] challenging the resulting new judgment is not 2 ‘second or successive’ at all”
How later courts described this case
- holding that “where . . . there is a ‘new judgment intervening 22 23 1 That matter remains pending on appeal in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. USCA Case No. 14-99009 1 between the two habeas petitions,’ [the petition] challenging the resulting new judgment is not 2 ‘second or successive’ at all”
- recognizing exception when “there is a ‘new judgment intervening between the two habeas petitions,’” and reasoning that “an application challenging the resulting new judgment is not ‘second or successive’ at all” (quoting Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147, 156 (2007))
- holding that a second 3 habeas petition challenging an intervening judgment imposed after resentencing was not 4 “second or successive” under the AEDPA, where the first habeas petition was filed prior 5 to resentencing and challenged the original judgment
- concluding that, “where .. . there is a ‘new judgment intervening between the two habeas petitions,’ . . . an application challenging the resulting new judgment is not ‘second or successive’ at all” (quoting Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147, 156 (2007))
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Questioned by Alonzo Suggs v. United States, 705 F.3d 279 (2013)
However, because Magwood explicitly limited its holding so as not to reach the situation we face here, we are not persuaded that we should overrule our precedent.
Distinguished
Distinguished by United States v. Garza, 624 F. App'x 208 (2015)
Specifically, the government argued that Magwood was distinguishable from Garza’s case because the 2014 reentry of Garza’s 2000 criminal judgment was “merely a legal fiction created to allow an equitable ‘reset’ of the appellate timetable,” rather than the type of “new judgment” contemplated in Magwood.
The opinion
Justice Breyer,
with whom
Justice Stevens and Justice Sotomayor join, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
I join the Court’s well-reasoned opinion with the exception of Part IV-B. The Court neither purports to alter nor does alter our holding in Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U. S. 930 (2007). See ante, at 335, n. 11. In Panetti , we “declined to interpret ‘second or successive’ as referring to all §2254 applications filed second or successively in time, even when the later filings address a state-court judgment already challenged in a prior §2251 application.” 551 U. S., at 944 (emphasis added). In this case, by contrast, we determine how 28 U. S. C. § 2244 (b) applies to a habeas petition that is the first petition to address a new “state-court judgment” that has not “already [been] challenged in a prior § 2254 application.” And, for the reasons provided by the Court, such a “first” petition is not “second or successive.” Of course, as the dissent correctly states, if Magwood were challenging an undisturbed state-court judgment for the second time, abuse-of-the-writ principles would apply, including Panetti’s holding that an “application” containing a “claim” that “the petitioner had no fair opportunity to raise” in his first habeas petition is not a “second or successive” application. Post, at 346 (opinion of Kennedy, J.). Contrary to the dissent’s assertion, post, at 349-350, the Court’s decision today and our decision in Panetti fit comfortably together.