stating that, even without Jackson, "any suspect subject to custodial interrogation has the right to have a lawyer present if he so requests, and to be advised of that right.... These three layers of prophylaxis are sufficient. Under the Miranda-Edwards-Minnick line of cases (which is not in doubt), a defendant who does not want to speak to the police without counsel present need only say as much when he is first approached and given the Miranda warnings.... If that regime suffices to protect the integrity of a ‘suspect's voluntary choice not to speak outside his lawyer's presence’ before his arraignment, it is hard to see why it would not also suffice to protect that same choice after arraignment, when Sixth Amendment rights have attached.”
How later courts described this case
- stating that, even without Jackson, "any suspect subject to custodial interrogation has the right to have a lawyer present if he so requests, and to be advised of that right.... These three layers of prophylaxis are sufficient. Under the Miranda-Edwards-Minnick line of cases (which is not in doubt), a defendant who does not want to speak to the police without counsel present need only say as much when he is first approached and given the Miranda warnings.... If that regime suffices to protect the integrity of a ‘suspect's voluntary choice not to speak outside his lawyer's presence’ before his arraignment, it is hard to see why it would not also suffice to protect that same choice after arraignment, when Sixth Amendment rights have attached.”
- explaining that “when a defendant is read his Miranda rights (which include the right to have counsel present during interrogation) and agrees to waive those rights, that typically does the trick [for establishing a valid waiver] even though the Miranda rights purportedly have their source in the Fifth Amendment”
- finding that because the right to counsel under both the Fifth and Sixth Amendments “is waived using the same procedure, ... doctrines ensuring voluntariness of the Fifth Amendment waiver simultaneously ensure the voluntariness of the Sixth Amendment waiver”
- concluding that " [i]f Montejo made a clear assertion of the right to counsel when the officers approached him about accompanying them on the *572 excursion for the murder weapon, then no interrogation should have taken place unless Montejo initiated it"
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Declined to follow by State of West Virginia v. William Bevel, 231 W. Va. 346 (2013)
For the reasons provided herein, we decline to adopt Montejo and find that the right to counsel that has been recognized in this state for more than a quarter century continues to be guaranteed by article III, section 14 of the West Virginia Constitution.
Distinguished
Distinguished by State v. Jinkerson, 554 S.W.3d 559 (2018)
Defendant counters that Montejo is distinguishable because, while here Defendant specifically asserted his Sixth Amendment right to an attorney by retaining Counsel, the defendant in Montejo had an attorney appointed for him by the court, such that he never personally invoked his right.
The opinion
Justice Breyer,
dissenting.
I join Justice Stevens’ dissent except for footnote 5. Although the principles of stare decisis are not inflexible, I believe they bind the Court here. I reached a similar conclusion in Arizona v. Gant, ante, at 354-355 (dissenting opinion), and in several other recent cases. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U. S. 877, 923-929 (2007) (same); Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 551 U. S. 701, 865-866 (2007) (same); Federal Election Comm’n v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U. S. 449, 534-536 (2007) (Souter, J., dissenting); Bowles v. Russell, 551 U. S. 205, 219-220 (2007) (Souter, J., dissenting); Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U. S. 124, 190-191 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U. S. 570, 675-679 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting).