holding that: despite the advisory nature of the Sentencing Guidelines, they remain “the starting point and the initial benchmark” of a district court’s sentencing analysis; the “district court should begin all sentencing proceedings by correctly calculating the applicable Guidelines range” and keep that range in mind throughout the sentencing process; and that “failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range ... or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence&emdash;in-cluding an explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines range[,]” constitutes “significant procedural error;” ...
How later courts described this case
- holding that: despite the advisory nature of the Sentencing Guidelines, they remain “the starting point and the initial benchmark” of a district court’s sentencing analysis; the “district court should begin all sentencing proceedings by correctly calculating the applicable Guidelines range” and keep that range in mind throughout the sentencing process; and that “failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range ... or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence&emdash;in-cluding an explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines range[,]” constitutes “significant procedural error;” ...
- explaining that a criminal sentence is 1 I would not reach whether my proposed Excessive Fines Clause test for civil fines also applies to criminal fines. Unlike civil fines, criminal fines are already governed by the Sentencing Guidelines and the factors laid out in 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553 (a) and 3572. So, a different test may be required in the criminal fines context. USCA11 Case: 20-10276 Date Filed: 12/29/2021 Page: 70 of 96 2 TJOFLAT, J., Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part 20-10276 procedurally unreasonable when the district court “fail[s] to ade- quately explain the chosen sentence”
- concluding, in upholding a sentence of probation when the Guidelines sentencing range was 30 to 37 months of imprisonment, that “[g]iven the dramatic contrast between Gall's behavior before he joined the conspiracy and his conduct after withdrawing, it was not unreasonable for the District Judge to view Gall's immaturity at the time of the offense as a mitigating factor, and his later behavior as a sign that he had matured and would not engage in such impetuous and ill- considered conduct in the future. Indeed, his consideration of that factor finds support in our cases.”
- holding that a sentence is procedurally reasonable if "the district court committed no significant procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence” (emphasis added)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice & alia,
concurring.
I join the opinion of the Court.
In Rita v. United States, 551 U. S. 338, 370-375 (2007) (opinion concurring in part and concurring in judgment), I wrote separately to state my view that any appellate review of sentences for substantive reasonableness will necessarily result in a sentencing scheme constitutionally indistinguishable from the mandatory Guidelines struck down in United States v. Booker, 543 U. S. 220 (2005). Whether a sentencing scheme uses mandatory Guidelines, a “proportionality test” for Guidelines variances, or a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard, there will be some sentences upheld only on the basis of additional judge-found facts.
Although I continue to believe that substantive-reasonableness review is inherently flawed, I give stare decisis effect to the statutory holding of Rita . The highly deferential standard adopted by the Court today will result in far fewer unconstitutional sentences than the proportionality standard employed by the Eighth Circuit. Moreover, as I noted in Rita , the Court has not foreclosed as-applied constitutional challenges to sentences. The door therefore remains open for a defendant to demonstrate that his sentence, whether inside or outside the advisory Guidelines range, would not have been upheld but for the existence of a fact found by the sentencing judge and not by the jury.