concluding that the FAA “substantiat[es] a national policy favoring arbitration’s essential virtue of resolving disputes straightaway” and explaining that “[aJny other reading opens the door to the full-bore legal and evidentiary appeals that can render informal arbitration merely a prelude to a more cumbersome and time-consuming judicial review process . . . and bring arbitration theory to grief in post arbitration process.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)
How later courts described this case
- concluding that the FAA “substantiat[es] a national policy favoring arbitration’s essential virtue of resolving disputes straightaway” and explaining that “[aJny other reading opens the door to the full-bore legal and evidentiary appeals that can render informal arbitration merely a prelude to a more cumbersome and time-consuming judicial review process . . . and bring arbitration theory to grief in post arbitration process.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)
- holding that sections 10 and 11 of the FAA provide exclusive grounds for the review under the statute and regardless of the parties’ agreement to the contrary, district courts must review an arbitrator’s findings of fact and conclusions of law under the highly deferential standard set forth in 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)
- holding that “every circuit that has considered the question ... [has] held that the mere inclusion of a choice-of-law clause within the arbitration agreement is insufficient to indicate the parties’ intent to contract for the application of state law concerning judicial review of awards”
- holding that 9 U.S.C. §§10 and 11 provide the exclusive grounds upon which an arbitration award may be vacated or modified, and that the parties may not agree to expand the scope of judicial review to allow vacatur or modification based on the arbitrator’s legal error
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Questioned by Sharp v. Downey, 197 Md. App. 123 (2010)
Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 128 S.Ct. 1396, 170 L.Ed.2d 254 (2008), has cast doubt on the viability of “manifest disregard of the law” as a ground for vacatur of an arbitral award under the FAA.
Questioned by Sotheby's International Realty, Inc. v. Relocation Group, LLC, 987 F. Supp. 2d 157 (2013)
Hall Street Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 584, 128 S.Ct. 1396, 170 L.Ed.2d 254 (2008), in which the Supreme Court held the FAA's statutorily enumerated grounds for vacatur of arbitral awards to be exhaustive, initially appeared to call into question the vitality of the manifest-disregard doctrine.
Questioned by Ameriprise Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Brady, 325 F. Supp. 3d 219 (2018)
See Mt.Valley Prop. v. Applied Risk Servs. , 863 F.3d 90, 94-95 (1st Cir. 2017) ("[T]he Supreme Court, in Hall Street Associates, LLC v. Mattel, Inc. , 552 U.S. 576, 128 S.Ct. 1396, 170 L.Ed.2d 254 (2008), cast doubt on the continued existence of manifest disregard of the law as a ground for vacatur, and this court stated just this year that the doctrine remains 'only as a judicial gloss.' Ortiz-Espinosa v. BBVA Sec.…
Questioned by Union de Tronquistas de Puerto Rico v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 960 F. Supp. 2d 354 (2013)
However, the First Circuit has noted that the Supreme Court cast doubt on the manifest-disregard doctrine in Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 128 S.Ct. 1396, 170 L.Ed.2d 254 (2008).
Questioned by Crescent Property Partners, LLC v. American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co., 158 So. 3d 798 (2015)
Furthermore, its viability as a separate, common-law basis for upsetting an arbitration award has been called into question by Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 128 S.Ct. 1396, 170 L.Ed.2d 254 (2008).
Questioned by Unión De Tronquistas De Puerto Rico, Local 901 v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 3d 246 (2016)
In Hall Street Associates, the Supreme.Court cast doubt on whether manifest disregard of the law is an independent ground for review or merely judicial "shorthand” for the enumerated grounds in the FAA, holding that the FA A enumerates the exclusive grounds for vacating an arbitration award.
The opinion
Justice Breyer,
dissenting.
The question presented in this case is whether “the Federal Arbitration Act . . . precludes a federal court from enforcing” an arbitration agreement that gives the court the power to set aside an arbitration award that embodies an arbitrator’s mistake about the law. Pet. for Cert. i. Like the majority and Justice Stevens, and primarily for the reasons they set forth, I believe that the Act does not preclude enforcement of such an agreement. See ante, at 590 (opinion of the Court) (The Act “is not the only way into court for parties wanting review of arbitration awards”); ante, at 595 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (The Act is a “shield meant to protect parties from hostile courts, not a sword with which to cut down parties’ 'valid, irrevocable and enforceable’ agreements to arbitrate their disputes subject to judicial review for errors of law”).
. At the same time, I see no need to send the case back for further judicial decisionmaking. The agreement here was entered into with the consent of the parties and the approval of the District Court. Aside from the Federal Arbitration Act itself, 9 U. S. C. § 1 et seq., respondent below pointed to no statute, rule, or other relevant public policy that the agreement might violate. The Court has now rejected its argument that the agreement violates the Act, and I would simply remand the case with instructions that the Court of Appeals affirm the District Court’s judgment enforcing the arbitrator’s final award.