explaining that, when a trial court on remand "impose[s] a sentence on the remaining counts longer than the sentence originally imposed on those particular counts, but yielding an aggregate sentence no longer than the aggregate sentence initially imposed,” the defendant "may [have] gain[ed] nothing from his limited success on appeal, but he will also lose nothing, as he will serve no more time than the trial court originally ordered”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that, when a trial court on remand "impose[s] a sentence on the remaining counts longer than the sentence originally imposed on those particular counts, but yielding an aggregate sentence no longer than the aggregate sentence initially imposed,” the defendant "may [have] gain[ed] nothing from his limited success on appeal, but he will also lose nothing, as he will serve no more time than the trial court originally ordered”
- explaining that where a trial court, on remand, has “imposed a sentence on the remaining counts longer than the sentence originally imposed on those particular counts, but yielding an aggregate sentence no longer than the aggregate sentence initially imposed,” the defendant “may gain nothing from his limited success on appeal, but he will also lose nothing, as he will serve no more time than the trial court originally ordered”
- holding that in “sentencing package cases,” an appellate court “may vacate the entire sentence on all counts so that, on remand, the trial court can reconfigure the sentencing plan to ensure that it remains adequate to satisfy the sentencing factors 6 Again, Gross does not challenge the jury’s finding that he engaged in harassing conduct that caused Wu substantial emotional distress. -10- in 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (a)”
- stating that in “our adversary system, in both civil and criminal cases, in the first instance and on appeal, we follow the principle of party presentation. That is, we rely on the parties to frame the issues for decision and assign to courts the role of neutral arbiter of matters the parties present”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice Breyer,
concurring in the judgment.
I agree with Justice Alito that the cross-appeal requirement is simply a rule of practice for appellate courts, rather than a limitation on their power, and I therefore join Parts I — III of his opinion. Moreover, as a general matter, I would leave application of the rule to the courts of appeals, with our power to review their discretion “seldom to be called into action.” Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U. S. 474, 490 (1951). But since this case is now before us, I would consider whether the Court of Appeals here acted properly. Primarily for the reasons stated by the majority in footnote 9 of its opinion, I believe that the court abused its discretion in sua sponte increasing petitioner’s sentence. Our precedent precludes the creation of an exception to the cross-appeal requirement based solely on the obviousness of the *256 lower court’s error. See, e. g., Chittenden v. Brewster, 2 Wall. 191, 195-196 (1865). And I cannot see how the interests of justice are significantly disserved by permitting petitioner’s release from prison at roughly age 62, after almost 37 years behind bars, as opposed to age 77.