holding that former version of AS 09.30.070(a), providing for 10,5% interest, applied to causes of action accruing before August 7, 1997
How later courts described this case
- holding that former version of AS 09.30.070(a), providing for 10,5% interest, applied to causes of action accruing before August 7, 1997
- holding that due process clause prohibited jury from basing punitive damages award “in part upon its desire to punish the defendant for harming persons who are not before the court (e.g., victims whom the parties do not represent)”
- holding the Due Process Clause prevents punitive damage awards for harm inflicted on persons not party to the litigation, stating "the fundamental due process concerns to which our punitive damages cases refer — risks of arbitrariness, uncertainty, and lack of notice — will be magnified"
- holding that “[a] punitive damages award based in part on a jury’s desire to punish a defendant for harming nonparties amounts to a taking of property from the defendant without due process”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Ruhe v. Masimo Corp., 14 F. Supp. 3d 1342 (2014)
Nor did Masimo’s brief “outright misstate[ ] the law” by then arguing that Philip Morris was distinguishable.
The opinion
Justice Thomas,
dissenting.
I join Justice Ginsbueg’s dissent in full. I write separately to reiterate my view that “‘the Constitution does not constrain the size of punitive damages awards.’” State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U. S. 408, 429-430 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U. S. 424, 443 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring)). It matters not that the Court styles today’s holding as “procedural” because the “procedural” rule is simply a confusing implementation of the substantive due process regime this Court has created for punitive damages. See Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Has-lip, 499 U. S. 1, 26-27 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (“In 1868 . . . punitive damages were undoubtedly an established part of the American common law of torts. It is ... clear that no particular procedures were deemed necessary to circumscribe a jury’s discretion regarding the award of such damages, or their amount”). Today’s opinion proves once again that this Court’s punitive damages jurisprudence is “insusceptible of principled application.” BMW of North *362 America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U. S. 559, 599 (1996) (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., dissenting).