explaining in a different but analogous context, " ’[t]o find that a state statute creates a crime outside the generic definition of a listed crime in a federal statute requires more than the application of legal imagination to a state statute's language. It requires a realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility, that the State would apply its statute to conduct that falls outside the generic definition of a crime' ” (quoting Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 127 S.Ct. 815, 822, 166 L.Ed.2d 683, (2007))
How later courts described this case
- explaining in a different but analogous context, " ’[t]o find that a state statute creates a crime outside the generic definition of a listed crime in a federal statute requires more than the application of legal imagination to a state statute's language. It requires a realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility, that the State would apply its statute to conduct that falls outside the generic definition of a crime' ” (quoting Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 127 S.Ct. 815, 822, 166 L.Ed.2d 683, (2007))
- explaining that the categorical approach to the residual clause of 18 U.S.C. § 924 (e) does not “requir[e] that every conceivable factual offense covered by a statute must necessarily present a serious potential risk of injury before the offense can be deemed a violent felony,” but that “the proper inquiry is whether the conduct encompassed by the elements of the offense, in the ordinary case, presents a serious potential risk of injury to another”
- determining whether "attempted burglary, as defined by Florida law, is an offense that 'involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another' " by "employing] the 'categorical approach,' " that is, considering "whether the elements of the offense are of the type that would justify its inclusion within the residual provision, without inquiring into the specific conduct of this particular offender”
- concluding that a burglar, who might be confronted by police or a passerby, presents a “risk of violent confrontation” that satisfies the ACCA’s requirements and noting that “[t]he main risk of burglary [a listed crime under ACCA] arises not from the simple physical act of wrongfully entering onto another’s property, but rather from the possibility of a face-to-face confrontation between the burglar and a third party”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled on other grounds by Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015)
Listed in the Constitution Annotated's table of Supreme Court decisions overruled by subsequent decision (entry 235, expressly overruled).
Supreme Court of the United StatesJun 26, 201558 citing opinionsother groundsofficial confidenceRead itOverruled — as noted by 3 later courts
Our contrary holdings in James [v. United States, 550 U.S. 192 (127 S.Ct. 1586, 167 L.Ed.2d 532] (2007) ] and Sykes [v. United States, 564 U.S. 1 [131 S.Ct. 2267, 180 L.Ed.2d 60] (2011) ] are overruled.”).
3 citing opinionsOverruled on other grounds by Johnson v. United States, 176 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2010)
550 U.S. 192, 214 (2007), overruled on separate grounds by Johnson, 559 U.S. 133
Overruled on other grounds by Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239 (2015)
550 U.S. 192, 208 (2007) (noting in the ACCA context that attempted murder is a “prototypically violent crime”), overruled on other grounds by Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2251
The opinion
Justice Thomas,
dissenting.
For the reasons set forth in my opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment in Shepard v. United Suites, 544 U. S. 13, 27 (2005), I believe that “[t]he constitutional infirmity of § 924(e)(1) as applied to [James] makes today’s decision an unnecessary exercise.” Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U. S. 466 (2000), and its progeny prohibit judges from “mak[ing] a finding that raises [a defendant’s] sentence beyond the sentence that could have lawfully been imposed by reference to facts found by the jury or admitted by the defendant.” United States v. Booker, 543 U. S. 220, 317-318 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting in part). Yet that is precisely what the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U. S. C. § 924 (e) (2000 ed. and Supp. IV), permits in this case.
Petitioner Alphonso James pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of § 922(g)(1) (2000 ed.), which exposed him to a maximum sentence of 10 years under § 924(a)(2). Section 924(e)(1) (2000 ed., Supp. IV), however, mandated a minimum 15-year sentence if James had three prior convictions for “a violent felony or a serious drug offense.” James admitted he had been convicted of three prior felonies, but he argued that one of those felonies — his conviction for attempted burglary of a dwelling, in violation of Fla. Stat. §§ 810.02 and 777.04 (2006) — was not a “violent felony” for purposes of 18 U. S. C. § 924 (e)(1) (2000 ed., Supp. IV). The District Court resolved this disputed fact in favor of the Government and increased James’ sentence accordingly. Relying on the scheme we initially created in Taylor v. United States, 495 U. S. 575 (1990), the Court of Appeals affirmed.
Section 924(e)(1), in conjunction with Taylor, Shepard, and now today’s decision, “explain[s] to lower courts how to conduct factfinding that is, according to the logic of this Court’s *232 intervening precedents, unconstitutional in this very case.” Shepard, supra, at 27 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). For that reason, I respectfully dissent.