finding that 9 authenticated video of a car chase showing “vehicle racing down narrow, two-lane roads in the 10 dead of night at speeds that are shockingly fast. . . , swerve[ing] around more than a dozen other 11 cars, cross[ing] the double-yellow line, and forc[ing] cars traveling in both directions to their 12 respective shoulders to avoid being hit” that “quite clearly contradict[ed]” non-moving party’s 13 testimony that “there was little, if any, actual threat to pedestrians or other motorists” may be 14 considered in granting summary judgment
How later courts described this case
- finding that 9 authenticated video of a car chase showing “vehicle racing down narrow, two-lane roads in the 10 dead of night at speeds that are shockingly fast. . . , swerve[ing] around more than a dozen other 11 cars, cross[ing] the double-yellow line, and forc[ing] cars traveling in both directions to their 12 respective shoulders to avoid being hit” that “quite clearly contradict[ed]” non-moving party’s 13 testimony that “there was little, if any, actual threat to pedestrians or other motorists” may be 14 considered in granting summary judgment
- explaining that at the summary judgment stage, “courts are required to view the facts and draw reasonable inferences ‘in the light most favorable to the party opposing the [summary judgment] motion ... In qualified immunity cases, this usually means adopting ... the plaintiffs version of the facts” (citing United *637 States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962) (per curiam) (alteration in original))
- holding that a police officer's use of deadly force to stop a high speed car chase was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment through "weighing the perhaps lesser probability of injuring or killing numerous bystanders against the perhaps larger probability of injuring or killing a single person," by taking into account "the number of lives at risk" and the "relative culpability" of the police officer and the respondent
- explaining, in assessing summary judgment ruling where video evidence “blatantly 20 contradicted” party’s allegations, that when a party’s “version of events is so utterly discredited by the record that no reasonable jury could have believed him,” a court “should not . . . rel[y] on such visible fiction[, but should instead] view[] the facts in the light depicted by the videotape”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Eberhardinger v. City of York, 341 F. Supp. 3d 420 (2018)
We find that Plumhoff and Scott represent very different circumstances and thus are inapposite to the matter at hand.
Distinguished by State v. Daniel G., 147 Conn. App. 523 (2014)
” Harris and Santos are distinguishable because the video in this case does not conclusively establish the facts underlying the charge of § 14-223 (b).
Distinguished by Grant v. Winik, 948 F. Supp. 2d 480 (2013)
The Court notes that Scott is distinguishable in that the record before the Scott Court included objective video tape evidence depicting the respondent's reckless driving, the facts of which the respondent contested at the summary judgment phase. 550 U.S. at 376, 127 S.Ct. 1769 (reversing district and appellate courts’ denial of summaiy judgment in excessive force case based on "mate
Distinguished by Gallegos v. Freeman, 172 Wash. App. 616 (2013)
Accordingly, the rule set forth in Scott is inapplicable in this case.
The opinion
Justice Ginsburg,
concurring.
I join the Court’s opinion and would underscore two points. First, I do not read today’s decision as articulating a mechanical, per se rule. Cf. post, at 389 (Breyer, J., concurring). The inquiry described by the Court, ante, at 383-385 and this page, is situation specific. Among relevant considerations: Were the lives and well-being of others (motorists, pedestrians, police officers) at risk? Was there a safer way, given the time, place, and circumstances, to stop the fleeing vehicle? “[AJdmirable” as “[an] attempt to craft an easy-to-apply legal test in the Fourth Amendment context [may be],” the Court explains, “in the end we must still slosh our way through the factbound morass of‘reasonableness.’” Ante, at 383.
Second, were this case suitable for resolution on qualified immunity grounds, without reaching the constitutional question, Justice Breyer’s discussion would be engaging. See post, at 387-389 (urging the Court to overrule Saucier v. Katz, 533 U. S. 194 (2001)). In joining the Court’s opinion, *387 however, Justice Breyer apparently shares the view that, in the appeal before us, the constitutional question warrants an answer. The video footage of the car chase, he agrees, demonstrates that the officer’s conduct did not transgress Fourth Amendment limitations. See post this page. Confronting Saucier, therefore, is properly reserved for another day and case. See ante, at 377, n. 4.