explaining that although a willful FCRA violation can be supported by “recklessness,” after considering the. relevant statutory subsection, appellate case law, and FTC Guidance, “a company subject to FCRA does not act’ in reckless disregard of it unless the action is not only a violation under a reasonable reading of the statute’s terms, but shows that the company ran a risk of violating the law substantially greater than the risk associated with a reading that was merely careless”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that although a willful FCRA violation can be supported by “recklessness,” after considering the. relevant statutory subsection, appellate case law, and FTC Guidance, “a company subject to FCRA does not act’ in reckless disregard of it unless the action is not only a violation under a reasonable reading of the statute’s terms, but shows that the company ran a risk of violating the law substantially greater than the risk associated with a reading that was merely careless”
- finding that liability under Section 1681n(a) for “willfully failing] to comply” with FCRA covers both knowing and reckless violations of the statute and that “a company subject to the FCRA does not act in reckless disregard of it unless the action is not only a violation under a reasonable reading of the statute’s terms, but shows that the company ran a risk of violating the law substantially greater than the risk associated with a reading that was merely careless”
- holding that plaintiff was not entitled to damages under § 1681n(a) for a willful violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act in part because “[g]iven this dearth of guidance and the less-than-pellucid statutory text, Safe-co’s reading was not objectively unreasonable, and so falls well short of raising the ‘unjustifiably high risk’ of violating the statute necessary for reckless liability”
- holding that a defendant "does not act in reckless disregard of [a statute] unless the action is not only a violation under a reasonable reading of the statute's terms, but shows that the [defendant] ran a risk of violating the law substantially greater than the risk associated with a reading that was merely careless"
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by United States ex rel. Streck v. Allergan, Inc., 894 F. Supp. 2d 584 (2012)
Therein, the Government argues that Safeco is inapplicable because the FCA imposes liability not only for reckless conduct, but also for deliberate ignorance.
The opinion
Justice Thomas,
with whom Justice Alito joins, concurring in part.
I agree with the Court’s disposition and most of its reasoning. Safeco did not send notices to new customers because it took the position that the initial insurance rate it offered a customer could not be an “increase in any charge for . . . insurance” under 15 U. S. C. § 1681a(k)(1)(B)(i). The Court properly holds that regardless of the merits of this interpretation, it is not an unreasonable one, and Safeco therefore did not act willfully. Ante, at 68-70. I do not join Part III-A of the Court’s opinion, however, because it resolves the merits of Safeco’s interpretation of § 1681a(k)(l)(B)(i)— an issue not necessary to the Court’s conclusion and not briefed or argued by the parties.