stating that the first step of the Bivens analysis involves determining “whether any alternative, existing process for protecting the interest amounts to a convincing reason for the Judicial Branch to refrain from providing a new and freestanding remedy in damages” and that the next step involves “weighing reasons for and against the creation of a new cause of action, the way common law judges have always done”
How later courts described this case
- stating that the first step of the Bivens analysis involves determining “whether any alternative, existing process for protecting the interest amounts to a convincing reason for the Judicial Branch to refrain from providing a new and freestanding remedy in damages” and that the next step involves “weighing reasons for and against the creation of a new cause of action, the way common law judges have always done”
- explaining that a “factor counseling hesitation” is the existence of an “alternative, existing process for protecting the interest amounts to a convincing reason for the Judicial Branch to refrain from providing a new and freestanding remedy in damages”
- discussing the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, and stating, “the Act itself does not provide for a standalone damages remedy against federal jailers. It could be argued that this suggests Congress chose not to extend the Carlson damages remedy to cases involving other types of prisoner mistreatment.”
- rejecting plaintiff’s “fall back” argument that defendants’ violation of Wyoming’s blackmail statute was a separate predicate offense because “the conduct alleged does not fit the traditional definition of extortion, so [the] RICO claim does not survive on a theory of state-law derivation”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by United States v. Renzi, 861 F. Supp. 2d 1014 (2012)
The Government argues that Wilkie is inapplicable to this case, because the SSI alleges that Renzi acted to benefit himself and Sandlin, not the federal government.
The opinion
Justice Thomas,
with whom Justice Scalia joins, concurring.
The Court correctly concludes that Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971), does not supply a cause of action in this case. I therefore join its opinion. I write separately because I would not extend Bivens even if its reasoning logically applied to this case. "Bivens is a relic of the heady days in which this Court assumed common-law powers to create causes of action.” Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U. S. 61, 75 (2001) (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., concurring). Accordingly, in my view, Bivens and its progeny should be limited "to the precise circumstances that they involved.” Malesko, supra, at 75 .