holding that a "federal court ha[s] discretion . . . to dismiss [a habeas petition] as untimely under AEDPA's one-year limitation" even though the State asserted the petition was timely; if this holding were extended by analogy, then a court of appeals might sua sponte question the timeliness of a notice of appeal in a federal criminal appeal
How later courts described this case
- holding that a "federal court ha[s] discretion . . . to dismiss [a habeas petition] as untimely under AEDPA's one-year limitation" even though the State asserted the petition was timely; if this holding were extended by analogy, then a court of appeals might sua sponte question the timeliness of a notice of appeal in a federal criminal appeal
- stating that the federal habeas corpus statute’s limitations period promotes judicial efficiency and' conservation of judicial resources, safeguards the accuracy of state-court judgments by requiring resolution of constitutional questions while the record is fresh, and lends finality to state court judgments within a reasonable time
- holding that district courts may consider, sua sponte, the timeliness of a state prisoner’s habeas petition if the court: (1) accords the parties fair notice and an opportunity to present their positions; and (2) assures itself that the petitioner is not significantly prejudiced by the delayed focus on the limitation issue
- holding “that district courts are permitted, but not obliged, to consider, sua sponte, the timeliness of a state prisoner’s habeas petition,” but explaining that “before acting on its own initiative, a court must accord the parties fair notice and an opportunity to present their positions”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice Stevens,
with whom
Justice Breyer joins, dissenting from the judgment.
Although Justice Breyer and I disagree on the proper answer to the question on which we granted certiorari — in my view, Justice Ginsburg’s opinion for the Court correctly decides that question, while Justice Breyer has joined Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion — we agree on the proper disposition of this case. In our view, the Court should announce its opinion now, but it should postpone the entry of judgment pending our decision in Lawrence v. Florida, No. 05-8820, cert. granted, post, p. 1039. As Justice Ginsburg notes, the question whether the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that Day’s habeas corpus petition was barred by the statute of limitations will be answered by our decision in Lawrence. See ante, at 203-204, n. 2. It seems improvident to affirm a possibly erroneous Court of Appeals judgment that dismissed Day’s habeas petition without an evaluation of its merits when we have already granted certiorari to address the issue on which the Court of Appeals may have erred. Of course, the Court of Appeals may avoid a miscarriage of justice by keeping this ease on its docket until after we decide Lawrence, but it would be better prac *212 tice for us to do so ourselves. Accordingly, we respectfully dissent from the entry of the Court’s judgment at this time.