explaining that “[formal job descriptions often bear little resemblance to the duties an employee actually is expected to perform, and the listing of a given task in an employee’s written job description is neither necessary nor sufficient to demonstrate that conducting the task is within the scope of the employee’s professional duties for First Amendment purposes” (quoting Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424-25, 126 S.Ct. 1951)
How later courts described this case
- explaining that “[formal job descriptions often bear little resemblance to the duties an employee actually is expected to perform, and the listing of a given task in an employee’s written job description is neither necessary nor sufficient to demonstrate that conducting the task is within the scope of the employee’s professional duties for First Amendment purposes” (quoting Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424-25, 126 S.Ct. 1951)
- stating that the long-standing view that a public employee had no right to object to conditions placed upon the terms of employment including restrictions on exercising constitutional rights has been tempered so that “... public employees do not surrender all their First Amendment rights by reason of their employment.”
- ruling that "[w]e ... have no occasion to articulate a comprehensive framework for de fining the scope of an employee’s duties in cases where there is room for serious debate ... [and w]e reject ... that employers can restrict employees' rights by creating excessively broad job descriptions.”
- recognizing that “[t]he First Amendment limits the ability of a public employer to leverage the employment relationship to restrict, incidentally or intentionally, the liberties employees enjoy in their capacities as private citizens” (citing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972))
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Questioned by Brown v. Chicago Board of Education, 973 F. Supp. 2d 870 (2013)
Because the Supreme Court has not decided these questions, Seventh Circuit (and of course Supreme Court) decisions on academic freedom remain in place and binding on this Court — even though Garcetti casts doubt on the availability of First Amendment protection for teacher speech (including classroom instruction) made pursuant to job duties.
Disagreed with by Schumann v. Dianon Systems, Inc., 304 Conn. 585 (2012)
Id. The court rejected as "unpersuasive" the plaintiff's claim that "Garcetti is inapplicable to the present case, because it did not involve the termination of a private employee," stating that, "[w]hile Garcetti specifically held that a public employee has no [f]irst [a]mendment protection for job-related `official' speech ... the case did not alter the general rule that private employees are generally entitled to…
Distinguished
Distinguished by Werkheiser v. Pocono Township, 210 F. Supp. 3d 633 (2016)
Finding that Garcetti is inapplicable to elected officials’ speech does not end the inquiry.
Distinguished by Melville v. Town of Adams, 9 F. Supp. 3d 77 (2014)
Arguably, it may not have been clearly established that Garcetti was inapplicable to elected officials.
Distinguished by Caruso v. City of New York, 973 F. Supp. 2d 430 (2013)
” Id. at 741 (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 686, 92 S.Ct. 2646, 33 L.Ed.2d 626 (1972)).12 In so doing, the Seventh Circuit determined that the reasons pronounced by the Supreme Court to support its Garcetti decision are inapplicable in the context of compelled testimony.
Distinguished by Weihua Huang v. Rector of the University of Virginia, 896 F. Supp. 2d 524 (2012)
Although the instant matter tangentially relates to academia, it does not represent an instance in which Garcetti is inapplicable.
The opinion
Justice Stevens,
dissenting.
The proper answer to the question “whether the First Amendment protects a government employee from discipline based on speech made pursuant to the employee's official duties,” ante, at 413, is “Sometimes,” not “Never.” Of course a supervisor may take corrective action when such speech is “inflammatory or misguided,” ante, at 423. But what if it is just unwelcome speech because it reveals facts that the supervisor would rather not have anyone else discover? *
*427 As Justice Souter explains, public employees are still citizens while they are in the office. The notion that there is a categorical difference between speaking as a citizen and speaking in the course of one’s employment is quite wrong. Over a quarter of a century has passed since then-justice Rehnquist, writing for a unanimous Court, rejected “the conclusion that a public employee forfeits his protection against governmental abridgment of freedom of speech if he decides to express his views privately rather than publicly.” Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 439 U. S. 410, 414 (1979). We had no difficulty recognizing that the First Amendment applied when Bessie Givhan, an English teacher, raised concerns about the school’s racist employment practices to the principal. See id., at 413-416 . Our silence as to whether or not her speech was made pursuant to her job duties demonstrates that the point was immaterial. That is equally true today, for it is senseless to let constitutional protection for exactly the same words hinge on whether they fall within a job description. Moreover, it seems perverse to fashion a new rule that provides employees with an incentive to voice their concerns publicly before talking frankly to their superiors.
While today’s novel conclusion to the contrary may not be “inflammatory,” for the reasons stated in Justice Souter’s dissenting opinion it is surely “misguided.”
See, e. g., Branton v. Dallas, 272 F. 3d 730 (CA5 2001) (police internal investigator demoted by police chief after bringing the false testimony of a fellow officer to the attention of a city official); Miller v. Jones, 444 F. 3d 929, 936 (CA7 2006) (police officer demoted after opposing the police chief’s attempt to “us[e] his official position to coerce a financially independent organization into a potentially ruinous merger”); Delgado v. Jones, 282 F. 3d 511 (CA7 2002) (police officer sanctioned for reporting criminal activity that implicated a local political figure who was a good friend of the police chief); Herts v. Smith, 345 F. 3d 581 (CA8 2003) (school district official’s contract was not renewed after she gave frank testimony about the district’s desegregation efforts); Kincade v. Blue Springs, 64 F. 3d 389 (CA8 1995) (engineer fired after reporting to his supervisors that contractors were failing to complete dam-related projects and that the resulting dam might be structurally unstable); Fox v. District of Columbia, 83 F. 3d *427 1491, 1494 (CADC 1996) (D. C. Lottery Board security officer fired after informing the police about a theft made possible by “rather drastic managerial ineptitude”).