holding, in connection with the selection phase of a capital sentencing proceeding, the Constitution mandates only that (1) the defendant has a right to present the sentencing authority with information relevant to the sentencing decision and (2) the sentencing authority is obligated to consider that information in determining the appropriate sentence
How later courts described this case
- holding, in connection with the selection phase of a capital sentencing proceeding, the Constitution mandates only that (1) the defendant has a right to present the sentencing authority with information relevant to the sentencing decision and (2) the sentencing authority is obligated to consider that information in determining the appropriate sentence
- holding, in light of the statutory scheme as a whole, that the statute's requirement that death be *426 imposed if aggravating and mitigating factors are in equipoise did not create a presumption in favor of death
- holding Walton compelled conclusion Kansas capital sentencing scheme satisfied Eighth Amendment requirements because Kansas scheme was functionally identical to scheme found constitutional in Walton, except it provided benefit to defendants by placing no evidentiary burden on them
- holding that states may permissibly draft sentencing regimes which cabin the sentencer's exercise of discretion "[s]o long as the sentencer is not precluded from considering relevant mitigating evidence”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Batiste v. State, 2013 Miss. LEXIS 295 (2013)
Batiste argues that Marsh is distinguishable because its holding rested on the fact that a mercy instruction was given, and no mercy instruction was given in Batiste’s case.
The opinion
*182 Justice Scalia,
concurring.
I join the opinion of the Court. I write separately to clarify briefly the import of my joinder, and to respond at somewhat greater length first to Justice Stevens’ contention that this case, and cases like it, do not merit our attention, and second to Justice Souter’s claims about risks inherent in capital punishment.
I
Part III of the Court’s opinion—which makes plain why Walton v. Arizona, 497 U. S. 689 (1990), controls this case— would be sufficient to reverse the judgment below. I nonetheless join Part IV as well, which describes why Kansas’s death-penalty statute easily satisfies even a capital jurisprudence as incoherent as ours has become. In doing so, I do not endorse that incoherence, but adhere to my previous statement that “I will not . . . vote to uphold an Eighth Amendment claim that the sentencer’s discretion has been unlawfully restricted.” Id., at 673 (concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
II