holding that although trial court’s firearm-specific sentence enhancement, based only on the jury’s finding that respondent was armed with a “deadly weapon," was erroneous under Ap-prendí and Blakely, error would be harmless if it was determined on remand that, had the sentencing factor been properly submitted to the jury, the jury would have found the element proved beyond a reasonable doubt
How later courts described this case
- holding that although trial court’s firearm-specific sentence enhancement, based only on the jury’s finding that respondent was armed with a “deadly weapon," was erroneous under Ap-prendí and Blakely, error would be harmless if it was determined on remand that, had the sentencing factor been properly submitted to the jury, the jury would have found the element proved beyond a reasonable doubt
- holding that error involving Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. at 303-04, 124 S.Ct. 2531, and the failure to submit a sentencing factor to a jury, like the failure to submit an element on an offense to the jury, is not structural error and is therefore subject to harmless error review
- concluding that when the court not only fails to submit an element to the jury, but also “mistakenly conclude[s] that the jury’s verdict was a complete verdict of guilt on the charges and imposed sentence accordingly!,]” the error was subject to harmless error analysis
- concluding that harmless error may apply where sentencing court determined that "firearm" enhancement applied, although jury found defendant had used a "deadly weapon," rather than a "firearm"
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice Kennedy,
concurring.
The opinions for the Court in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U. S. 466 (2000), Blakely v. Washington, 542 U. S. 296 (2004), and their progeny were accompanied by dissents. The Court does not revisit these cases today, and it describes their holdings accurately. On these premises, the Court’s analysis is correct. Cf. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U. S. 584, 613 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring). With these observations I join the Court’s opinion.