stating the United States Supreme Court's declaration in Agins v. Cityof Tiburon [1980], 447 U.S. 255, 100 S.Ct. 2138, that "`[t]he application of a general zoning law to particular property effects a taking if the ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate state interests'" was derived from due process, not takings, precedent, and concluding that the "substantially advances" formula announced in Agins is not a valid method for identifying regulatory takings under the Fifth Amendment that require just compensation
How later courts described this case
- stating the United States Supreme Court's declaration in Agins v. Cityof Tiburon [1980], 447 U.S. 255, 100 S.Ct. 2138, that "`[t]he application of a general zoning law to particular property effects a taking if the ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate state interests'" was derived from due process, not takings, precedent, and concluding that the "substantially advances" formula announced in Agins is not a valid method for identifying regulatory takings under the Fifth Amendment that require just compensation
- finding that “where [Government requires an owner to suffer a permanent physical invasion of her property-however minor-it must provide just compensation,” and where regulations “completely deprive an owner of all economically beneficial us[e] of her property,” the Government must pay just compensation (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)
- explaining that “the ‘substantially advances’ formula announced in Agins[, which held that the application of a zoning law to a property is a taking if the law does not substantially advance legitimate state interests,] is not a valid method of identifying regulatory takings for which the Fifth Amendment requires just compensation”
- stating that “whether [the government ac *814 tion] amounts to a physical invasion or instead merely affects property interests through some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good” is relevant to determining whether a taking occurred
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice Kennedy,
concurring.
This separate writing is to note that today’s decision does not foreclose the possibility that a regulation might be so arbitrary or irrational as to violate due process. Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U. S. 498, 539 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in part). The failure *549 of a regulation to accomplish a stated or obvious objective would be relevant to that inquiry. Chevron voluntarily dismissed its due process claim without prejudice, however, and we have no occasion to consider whether Act 257 of the 1997 Hawaii Session Laws “represents one of the rare instances in which even such a permissive standard has been violated.” Apfel, supra, at 550 . With these observations, I join the opinion of the Court.