finding that “the Oneidas’ long delay in seeking equitable relief against New York or its local units, and developments in the city of Sherrill spanning several generations, evoke the doctrines of laches, acquiescence, and impossibility, and render inequitable the piecemeal shift in governance this suit seeks unilaterally to initiate”
How later courts described this case
- finding that “the Oneidas’ long delay in seeking equitable relief against New York or its local units, and developments in the city of Sherrill spanning several generations, evoke the doctrines of laches, acquiescence, and impossibility, and render inequitable the piecemeal shift in governance this suit seeks unilaterally to initiate”
- holding that “the [t]ribe cannot unilaterally revive its ancient sovereignty, in whole or in part, over the parcels at issue [and that the tribe] long ago relinquished the reins of government and cannot regain them through open-market purchases from current titleholders”
- stating that Sherrill "supports the proposition that the nature of forward-looking, disruptive remedies generally will serve as equitable considerations that can bar such equitable remedies as re-possession, even against the United States”
- holding that the Oneida tribe could not “unilaterally revive its ancient sovereignty” over land “through open-market purchases from current titleholders” even though the land had previously been reservation land
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
*222 Justice Souter,
concurring.
I join the opinion of the Court with one qualification that goes to the appropriateness of considering the long dormancy of any claim to tribal authority over the parcels in question, as a basis to hold that the Oneida Indian Nation is not now immune from the taxing authority of local government. The Tribe’s claim, whether affirmative or defensive, see ante, at 214, n. 7, is one of territorial sovereign status entitled to recognition by the territorial state sovereign and its subdivisions. The claim of present sovereign status turns not only on background law and the provisions of treaties, but also on the Tribe’s behavior over a long period of time: the absence of the Tribe and tribal members from the particular lots of land, and the Tribe’s failure to assert sovereignty over them. The Tribe’s inaction cannot, therefore, be ignored here as affecting only a remedy to be considered later; it is, rather, central to the very claims of right made by the contending parties. Since the subject of inaction was not expressly raised as a separate question presented for review, see ante, at 214, n. 8, there is some question whether we should order reargument before dealing with it. I think that is unnecessary; the issue was addressed by each side in the argument prior to submission of the ease, notwithstanding the terms of the questions on which review was granted.