Opinion

Brown v. Payton

  • 544 U.S. 133
  • 125 S. Ct. 1432
  • 161 L. Ed. 2d 334
  • 2005 U.S. LEXIS 2753
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Filed
Mar 22, 2005
Status
Published
Author
Scalia
On the bench
Kennedy, O'Connor, Scalia, Thomas, Breyer, Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg, Rehnquist
Cited by
959 cases
Authority
More cited than 24.3%

holding that the California Supreme Court’s decision that a jury was not reasonably likely to think it could not consider post-conviction mitigation evidence when given a general jury instruction to consider all mitigation evidence, although perhaps “erroneous,” was not unreasonable under AEDPA

How later courts described this case

  • holding that the California Supreme Court’s decision that a jury was not reasonably likely to think it could not consider post-conviction mitigation evidence when given a general jury instruction to consider all mitigation evidence, although perhaps “erroneous,” was not unreasonable under AEDPA
  • concluding that 9th Circuit erred in granting relief; holding that, under AEDPA, "[e]ven on the assumption that [the California Supreme Court's] conclusion was incorrect, it was not unreasonable, and is therefore just the type of decision that AEDPA shields on habeas review"
  • concluding that 9th Circuit erred in granting relief; holding that, under AEDPA, "[ejven on the assumption that [the California Supreme Court's] conclusion was incorrect, it was not unreasonable, and is therefore just the type of decision that AEDPA shields on habeas review"
  • reviewing state-court application of Supreme Court precedent "to similar but not identical facts" and concluding that "[e]ven on the assumption that its conclusion was incorrect, it was not unreasonable, and is therefore just the type of decision that AEDPA shields on habeas review"

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

Justice Scalia,

with whom Justice Thomas joins, concurring.

I join the Court’s opinion, which correctly holds that the California Supreme Court’s decision was not “contrary to” or “an unreasonable application of” our cases. 28 U. S. C. § 2254 (d)(1). Even if our review were not circumscribed by statute, I would adhere to my view that limiting a jury’s discretion to consider all mitigating evidence does not violate *148 the Eighth Amendment. See Walton v. Arizona, 497 U. S. 639, 673 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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