holding that “all racial 2 Nevertheless, we assume that this argument is properly before us, notwithstanding the fact that (a) it was not specifically raised in Plaintiffs’ initial complaint, and (b) that the complaint was not amended. 4 1 classification” imposed by government “must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict 2 scrutiny”
How later courts described this case
- holding that “all racial 2 Nevertheless, we assume that this argument is properly before us, notwithstanding the fact that (a) it was not specifically raised in Plaintiffs’ initial complaint, and (b) that the complaint was not amended. 4 1 classification” imposed by government “must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict 2 scrutiny”
- holding that “all racial classification” im posed by government "must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny”
- holding California’s racially “neutral” practice of segregating inmates by race to avoid racial violence was a race classification triggering strict scrutiny notwithstanding the fact that the prison did not single out one race for differential treatment
- holding that strict scrutiny is the proper standard of review for a prisoner’s equal protection challenge to racial classifications
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Doe Ex Rel. Doe v. Lower Merion School District, 665 F.3d 524 (2011)
The District Court held that the level of scrutiny applied in Seattle, Grutter, Gratz, Adarand, Croson, and Johnson is inapposite here.
The opinion
*516 Justice Ginsburg,
with whom Justice Souter and Justice Breyer join,
concurring.
I join the Court’s opinion, subject to the reservation expressed in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U. S. 306, 344-346 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
The Court today resoundingly reaffirms the principle that state-imposed racial segregation is highly suspect and cannot, be justified on the ground that “ ‘all persons suffer [the separation] in equal degree.’” Ante, at 506 (quoting Powers v. Ohio, 499 U. S. 400, 410 (1991)). While I join that declaration without reservation, I write separately to express again my conviction that the same standard of review ought not control judicial inspection of every official race classification. As I stated most recently in Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U. S. 244, 301 (2003) (dissenting opinion): “Actions designed to burden groups long denied full citizenship stature are not sensibly ranked with measures taken to hasten the day when entrenched discrimination and its aftereffects have been extirpated.” See also Grutter, 539 U. S., at 344-346 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U. S. 200, 271-276 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
There is no pretense here, however, that the California Department of Corrections (CDC) installed its segregation policy to “correct inequalities.” See Wechsler, The Nationalization of Civil Liberties and Civil Rights, Supp. to 12 Tex. Q. 10, 23 (1968). Experience in other States and in federal prisons, see ante, at 508-509; post, at 519-520 (Stevens, J., dissenting), strongly suggests that CDC’s race-based assignment of new inmates and transferees, administratively convenient as it may be, is not necessary to the safe management of a penal institution.
Disagreeing with the Court that “strict scrutiny” properly applies to any and all racial classifications, see ante, at 505-509, 511-513, 514, but agreeing that the stereotypical classification at hand warrants rigorous scrutiny, I join the Court’s opinion.