concluding that judge unconstitution ally imposed sentence beyond statutory maximum after finding that defendant had acted with deliberate cruelty in committing crime
How later courts described this case
- concluding that judge unconstitution ally imposed sentence beyond statutory maximum after finding that defendant had acted with deliberate cruelty in committing crime
- holding that under the Sixth Amendment, the “ ‘statutory maximum’ ” is “the maximum [punishment] a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant,” and that it “is not the maximum [punishment] a judge may impose after finding *794 additional facts, but the maximum he may impose without any additional findings.” (some emphasis omitted)
- holding that a sentence of thirty-seven months beyond the statutory maximum imposed by a judge based on the judge’s factual finding of “deliberate cruelty” violated the rule set forth in Apprendi and stating that “the ‘statutory maximum’ for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant”
- holding that under the Sixth Amendment, the "statutory maximum" is "the maximum [punishment] a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant," and that it "is not the maximum [punishment] a judge may impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum he may impose without any additional findings."
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Reported overruled — as noted by a later court — not on the Supreme Court's list
Likewise, because Smith and Wheeler are premised on Thorne and a pre-Blakely and pre-Cunningham understanding of the right to jury trial, they are no longer good precedent on this issue.
unconfirmed confidenceQuestioned by United States v. Fruchter, 411 F.3d 377 (2005)
Numerous circuit court opinions issued afterApprendi, but before Blakely and Booker, have held that Apprendi is inapplicable to criminal forfeiture proceedings because forfeiture is an aspect of "sentencing" rather than a "separate charge.
Questioned by United States v. Rodriguez-Marrero, 390 F.3d 1 (2004)
But Blakely casts doubt on that logic.
Questioned by United States v. Aishauna Ward and Gregory Ward, 377 F.3d 671 (2004)
— U.S. -, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), calls into doubt the constitutionality of such enhancements.
Questioned by United States v. John D. Ohlinger, 377 F.3d 785 (2004)
— U.S. —, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), calls into doubt the constitutionality of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.
Questioned by United States v. Rusty Leisure, 412 F.3d 857 (2005)
542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), which called into doubt the constitutionality of the mandatory federal sentencing guidelines.
and 15 more.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Perkins v. Commonwealth, 2016 Ky. App. LEXIS 69 (2016)
Moreover, Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 299, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 2535, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004) was distinguishable because it concerned a judge imposing sentence based upon facts made by the court rather than findings made by a jury.
Distinguished by United States v. Childs, 976 F. Supp. 2d 981 (2013)
See Booker, 543 U.S. at 237, 125 S.Ct. 738 ("[The government] contends that [Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004)] is distinguishable because the Guidelines were promulgated by a Commission rather than the Legislature[.]”).
Distinguished by People v. Valles, 412 P.3d 537 (2013)
Rather, we conclude that Apprendi and Blakely are inapposite.
Distinguished by State v. Maxwell, 2011 Minn. App. LEXIS 110 (2011)
But several state and federal courts have addressed the issue and have uniformly held that Blakely and Apprendi are inapplicable to restitution orders because “restitution statutes do not set a maximum restitution amount that can be ordered.
The opinion
Justice Kennedy,
with whom Justice Breyer joins, dissenting.
The majority opinion does considerable damage to our laws and to the administration of the criminal justice system for all the reasons well stated in Justice O’Connor’s dissent, plus one more: The Court, in my respectful submission, disregards the fundamental principle under our constitutional system that different branches of government “converse with each other on matters of vital common interest.” Mistretta v. United States, 488 U. S. 361, 408 (1989). As the Court in Mistretta explained, the Constitution establishes a system of government that presupposes, not just “ ‘autonomy’ ” and “ ‘separateness,’ ” but also “ ‘interdependence’ ” and “ ‘reciprocity.’ ” Id., at 381 (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)). Constant, constructive discourse between our courts and our legislatures is an integral and admirable part of the constitutional design. Case-by-case judicial determinations often yield intelligible patterns that can be refined by legislatures and codified into statutes or rules as general standards. As these legislative enactments are followed by incremental judicial interpretation, the legis *327 latures may respond again, and the cycle repeats. This recurring dialogue, an essential source for the elaboration and the evolution of the law, is basic constitutional theory in action.
Sentencing guidelines are a prime example of this collaborative process. Dissatisfied with the wide disparity in sentencing, participants in the criminal justice system, including judges, pressed for legislative reforms. In response, legislators drew from these participants’ shared experiences and enacted measures to correct the problems, which, as Justice O’Connor explains, could sometimes rise to the level of a constitutional injury. As Mistretta recognized, this interchange among different actors in the constitutional scheme is consistent with the Constitution’s structural protections.
To be sure, this case concerns the work of a state legislature, and not of Congress. If anything, however, this distinction counsels even greater judicial caution. Unlike Mistretta , the case here implicates not just the collective wisdom of legislators on the other side of the continuing dialogue over fair sentencing, but also the interest of the States to serve as laboratories for innovation and experiment. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U. S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). With no apparent sense of irony that the effect of today’s decision is the destruction of a sentencing scheme devised by democratically elected legislators, the majority shuts down alternative, nonjudicial, sources of ideas and experience. It does so under a faintly disguised distrust of judges and their purported usurpation of the jury’s function in criminal trials. It tells not only trial judges who have spent years studying the problem but also legislators who have devoted valuable time and resources “calling upon the accumulated wisdom and experience of the Judicial Branch ... on a matter uniquely within the ken of judges,” Mistretta, supra, at 412 , that their efforts and judgments were all for naught. Numerous States that have enacted sentencing guidelines similar to the one in Washing *328 ton State are now commanded to scrap everything and start over.
If the Constitution required this result, the majority’s decision, while unfortunate, would at least be understandable and defensible. As Justice O’Connor’s dissent demonstrates, however, this is simply not the case. For that reason, and because the Constitution does not prohibit the dynamic and fruitful dialogue between the judicial and legislative branches of government that has marked sentencing reform on both the state and the federal levels for more than 20 years, I dissent.