holding that the meaning of relevance in the context of mitigating evidence introduced in a capital sentencing proceeding is no different than in any other context, and thus the general evidentiary standard of "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence" applies
How later courts described this case
- holding that the meaning of relevance in the context of mitigating evidence introduced in a capital sentencing proceeding is no different than in any other context, and thus the general evidentiary standard of "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence" applies
- explaining that evidence of "[i]mpaired intellectual functioning has mitigating dimension beyond the impact it has on the individual's ability to act deliberately," and thus, it "might serve as a basis for a sentence less than death" (internal quotations and citations omitted)
- stating that once the low threshold for relevant evidence is met, "the Eighth Amendment requires that the jury be able to consider and give effect to a capital defendant’s mitigating evidence” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)
- holding that petitioner was entitled to a COA on his Penry claim where his evidence of low IQ and impaired intellectual functioning had "mitigating dimension beyond the impact it has on the individual's ability to act deliberately"
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Sheppard v. Bagley, 657 F.3d 338 (2011)
Tennard is inapposite here because it was decided after the Ohio Supreme Court decision in this case.
The opinion
Justice Thomas,
dissenting.
Petitioner must rely on Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U. S. 302 (1989), to argue that Texas’ special issues framework unconstitutionally limited the discretion of his sentencing jury. I have long maintained, however, that Penry did “so much violence to so many of this Court’s settled precedents in an area of fundamental constitutional law, [that] it cannot command the force of stare decisis.” Graham v. Collins, 506 U. S. 461, 497 (1993) (concurring opinion). I therefore agree with Justice Scalia that a certificate of appealability can *295 not be issued based upon an “insubstantial right... derive[d] from case law in which this Court has long left the Constitution behind and embraced contradiction.” Ante, at 294 (dissenting opinion). I respectfully dissent.