holding that "considerations of ripeness are sufficiently important that we are required to raise the issue sua sponte even though the parties do not"
How later courts described this case
- holding that "considerations of ripeness are sufficiently important that we are required to raise the issue sua sponte even though the parties do not"
- finding that “Colorado’s ordinary ‘judicial review’ rules offer adequate assurance, not only that access to the courts can be promptly obtained, but also that a judicial decision will be promptly forthcoming”
- holding that it was proper to count grandfathered sites when determining whether location restrictions in an ordinance left open reasonable alternative avenues of expression for adult businesses
- explaining that ordinary judicial review of a licensing decision was sufficient where the ordinance was content neutral and only conditioned operation on neutral, nondiscriminatory criteria
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice Scalia,
concurring in the judgment.
Were the respondent engaged in activity protected by the First Amendment, I would agree with the Court’s disposition of the question presented by the facts of this case (though not with all of the Court’s reasoning). Such activity, when subjected to a general permit requirement unrelated to censorship of content, has no special claim to priority in the judicial process. The notion that media corporations have constitutional entitlement to accelerated judicial review of the denial of zoning variances is absurd.
I do not believe, however, that Z. J. Gifts is engaged in activity protected by the First Amendment. I adhere to the view I expressed in FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U. S. 215, 250 (1990) (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part): the pandering of sex is not protected by the First Amendment. “The Constitution does not require a State or municipality to permit a business that intentionally specializes in, *788 and holds itself forth to the public as specializing in, performance or portrayal of sex acts, sexual organs in a state of arousal, or live human nudity.” Id., at 258 . This represents the Nation’s long understanding of the First Amendment, recognized and adopted by this Court’s opinion in Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U. S. 463, 470-471 (1966). Littleton’s ordinance targets sex-pandering businesses, see Littleton City Code §3-14-2 (2003); to the extent it could apply to constitutionally protected expression its excess is not so great as to render it substantially overbroad and thus subject to facial invalidation, see FW/PBS, 493 U. S., at 261-262 . Since the city of Littleton “could constitutionally have proscribed the commercial activities that it chose instead to license, I do not think the details of its licensing scheme had to comply with First Amendment standards.” Id., at 253 .