explaining that, outside of specific contexts, such as the First Amendment, the Supreme Court has “discouraged” facial overbreadth challenges that assert a “law would be unconstitutionally applied to different parties and different circumstances from those at hand” because such challenges conflict with requirements for standing
How later courts described this case
- explaining that, outside of specific contexts, such as the First Amendment, the Supreme Court has “discouraged” facial overbreadth challenges that assert a “law would be unconstitutionally applied to different parties and different circumstances from those at hand” because such challenges conflict with requirements for standing
- recognizing the validity of pre-enforcement facial attacks in only a “few settings,” including abortion, based “on the strength of specific reasons weighty enough to overcome [the Supreme Court’s] well-founded reticence” to entertain such attacks generally (citing Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 938-946, 120 S.Ct. 2597, 147 L.Ed.2d 743 (2000))
- stating that “[t]he power to keep a watchful eye on expenditures and on the reliability of those who use public money is bound up with congressional authority to spend in the first place”
- arguing, by example, that the Court’s defense of § 666 “does not explain how there could be any federal interest in prosecuting a bribe paid to a city’s meat inspector . . . just because the city’s parks department had received a federal grant of $10,000” (quotation marks, editorial marks, and citation omitted)
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Adam Barbour v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, United States of America, Intervenor, 374 F.3d 1161 (2004)
The dissent's contention that Sabri is distinguishable because ''[r]ampant bribery of WMATA officials ... would make it more difficult for federal funds to do the job of providing mass transit,” while disability discrimination "would not,” Dissenting Op. at 1174, overlooks the Court's recognition that § 666 does not require "any connection between a bribe or kickback and some federal money.”
The opinion
Justice Kennedy,
with whom Justice Scalia joins,
concurring in part.
I join all but Part III of the Court’s opinion. I do not join Part III but do make this comment with reference to it. The Court in Part III does not specifically question the practice we have followed in cases such as United States v. Lopez, 514 U. S. 549 (1995), and United States v. Morrison, 529 U. S. 598 (2000). In those instances the Court did resolve the basic question whether Congress, in enacting the statutes challenged there, had exceeded its legislative power under the Constitution.