concluding that Congress had sufficient evidence of widespread constitutional violations to enact remedial legislation where, among other evidence “[a] report before Congress showed that some 76% of public services and programs housed in state-owned buildings were inaccessible to and unusable by persons with disabilities”
How later courts described this case
- concluding that Congress had sufficient evidence of widespread constitutional violations to enact remedial legislation where, among other evidence “[a] report before Congress showed that some 76% of public services and programs housed in state-owned buildings were inaccessible to and unusable by persons with disabilities”
- holding that in providing prophylactic relief in the context of a "fundamental right of access to [state] courts," Title II of the ADA "constitutes a valid exercise of Congress's § 5 authority to enforce the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment" and abrogates the states' Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity
- explaining that the situ- ation before the Court involved “basic rights, including the right of access to the courts . . . , that call for a standard of judicial review at least as searching, and in some cases more searching, than the standard that applies to sex- based classifications”
- stating that the federal Due Process and Confrontation Clauses “as applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment” guarantee criminal defendants be present at all stages of the trial where their absence might frustrate the fairness of the proceedings
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Questioned by Pace v. Bogalusa City School Board, 403 F.3d 272 (2005)
The continuing validity of Reickenbacker following the Supreme Court's decision in Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 124 S.Ct. 1978, 158 L.Ed.2d 820 (2004), is uncertain.
The opinion
Justice Souter,
with whom Justice Ginsburg joins,
concurring.
I join the Court’s opinion subject to the same caveats about the Court’s recent cases on the Eleventh Amendment and § 5 of the Fourteenth that I noted in Nevada Dept. of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U. S. 721, 740 (2003) (Souter, J., concurring).
Although I concur in the Court’s approach applying the congruence-and-proportionality criteria to Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 as a guarantee of access to courts and related rights, I note that if the Court engaged in a more expansive enquiry as The Chief Justice suggests, post, at 551 (dissenting opinion), the evidence to be considered would underscore the appropriateness of action under § 5 to address the situation of disabled individuals before the courts, for that evidence would show that the judiciary itself has endorsed the basis for some of the very discrimination subject to congressional remedy under §5. Buck v. Bell, 274 U. S. 200 (1927), was not grudging in sustaining the constitutionality of the once-pervasive practice of involuntarily sterilizing those with mental disabilities. See id., at 207 (“It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind. . . . Three generations of imbeciles are enough”). Laws compelling sterilization were often accompanied by others indiscriminately requiring institutionalization, and prohibiting certain individuals with disabilities from marrying, from voting, from attending public schools, and even from appearing in public. *535 One administrative action along these lines was judicially-sustained in part as a justified precaution against the very sight of a child with cerebral palsy, lest he produc[e] a depressing and nauseating effect” upon others. State ex rel. Beattie v. Board of Ed. of Antigo, 169 Wis. 231, 232 , 172 N. W. 153 (1919) (approving his exclusion from public school). 1
Many of these laws were enacted to implement the quondam science of eugenics, which peaked in the 1920’s, yet the statutes and their judicial vindications sat on the books long after eugenics lapsed into discredit. 2 See U. S. Commission on Civil Rights, Accommodating the Spectrum of Individual Abilities 19-20 (1983). Quite apart from the fateful inspiration behind them, one pervasive fault of these provisions was their failure to reflect the “amount of flexibility and freedom” required to deal with “the wide variation in the abilities and needs” of people with disabilities. Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U. S. 432, 445 (1985). Instead, like other invidious discrimination, they classified people without regard to individual capacities, and by that lack of regard did great harm. In sustaining the application of Title II today, the Court takes a welcome step away from the judiciary’s prior endorsement of blunt instruments imposing legal handicaps.
See generally Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U. S. 432, 463-464 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part); Burgdorf & Burgdorf, A History, of Unequal Treatment: The Qualifications of Handicapped Persons As A “Suspect Class” Under the Equal Protection Clause, 15 Santa Clara Law. 855 (1975); Brief for United States 17-19.
As the majority opinion shows, some of them persist to this day, ante, at 524-525, to say nothing of their lingering effects on society.