stating, "Given the historic and substantial state interest at issue, we therefore cannot conclude that the denial of funding for vocational religious instruction alone is inherently constitutionally suspect. Without a presumption of unconstitutionality, [respondent’s] claim must fail. The State’s interest in not funding the pursuit of devotional degrees is substantial and the exclusion of such funding places a relatively minor burden on [those involved in the funding pro gram]. If any room exists between the two Religion Clauses, it must be here. We need not venture further into this difficult area in order to uphold the [funding program] as currently operated by the State of Washington.”
How later courts described this case
- stating, "Given the historic and substantial state interest at issue, we therefore cannot conclude that the denial of funding for vocational religious instruction alone is inherently constitutionally suspect. Without a presumption of unconstitutionality, [respondent’s] claim must fail. The State’s interest in not funding the pursuit of devotional degrees is substantial and the exclusion of such funding places a relatively minor burden on [those involved in the funding pro gram]. If any room exists between the two Religion Clauses, it must be here. We need not venture further into this difficult area in order to uphold the [funding program] as currently operated by the State of Washington.”
- determining that “there is no doubt that the State could, consistent with the Federal Constitution, permit Promise Scholars to pursue a degree in devotional theology,” but nonetheless holding that “[g]iven the historic and substantial state interest at issue, we [] cannot conclude that the denial of funding for vocational religious instruction alone is inherently constitutionally suspect.”
- holding that state’s denial of funding for scholarship if field of study was preparation for the ministry did not violate the recipient’s rights under the Free Exercise Clause because he was not prevented from studying for the ministry
- finding that Washington had a “substantial” antiestablishment interest, despite the fact that there was “no doubt” that the State could have provided the scholarship in question without violating the Establishment Clause
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Pauley, 976 F. Supp. 2d 1137 (2013)
Trinity argues that Locke is distinguishable because the holding in Locke was explicitly limited to funding the religious training of clergy, and the Locke decision was based, at least in part, on a longstanding aversion to using tax dollars to fund the ministry and the concomitant finding that there are “few areas in which a State’s antiestablishment interests come more into play.
Distinguished by Bronx Household of Faith v. Board of Education, 876 F. Supp. 2d 419 (2012)
interest, here the Court faces a substantial burden on Plaintiffs’ free exercise rights11 and a misperceived Establishment Clause concern raised by Defendants.12 Because of this additional fact that the constitutional scales tilt in the opposite direction here than in Locke, the Court determines that Locke is inapposite.13 See Colo. Christian Univ., 534 F.3d at 1255-56 (“The Court’s ... holding [in Locke ] that ‘mino…
The opinion
Justice Thomas,
dissenting.
Because the parties agree that a “degree in theology” means a degree that is “devotional in nature or designed to induce religious faith,” Brief for Petitioners 6; Brief for Respondent 8, I assume that this is so for purposes of deciding this case. With this understanding, I join Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion. I write separately to note that, in my view, the study of theology does not necessarily implicate religious devotion or faith. The contested statute denies Promise Scholarships to students who pursue “a degree in theology.” See Wash. Admin. Code §250-80-020 (12)(g) (2003) (defining an “‘[eligible student,’” in part, as one who “[i]s not pursuing a degree in theology”); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §28B.10.814 (West 1997) (“No aid shall be awarded to any student who is pursuing a degree in theology”). But the statute itself does not define “theology.” And the usual definition of the term “theology” is not limited to devotional studies. “Theology” is defined as “[t]he study of the nature *735 of God and religious truth” and the “rational inquiry into religious questions.” American Heritage Dictionary 1794 (4th ed. 2000). See also Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 1223 (1991) (“the study of religious faith, practice, and experience” and “the study of God and his relation to the world”). These definitions include the study of theology from a secular perspective as well as from a religious one.
Assuming that the State denies Promise Scholarships only to students who pursue a degree in devotional theology, I believe that Justice Scalia’s application of our precedents is correct. Because neither party contests the validity of these precedents, I join Justice Scalia’s dissent.